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Theodore Roosevelt in American Historical Writing, 1945-1960

During recent years Theodore Roosevelt has acquired a new vogue. The centennial observance of his birth, in 1958, seemed to reveal a new appreciation for the controversial Rough Rider and to disclose what Hermann Hagedorn describes as a deep reservoir of "nostalgic memories of Theodore Roosevelt, and of youthful enthusiasm, undimmed by the passage of time. . . ."¹ Recent historical writing in America has reflected the revival of interest in the nation's twenty-sixth President.² Indeed, Roosevelt has become a rival of such heroic figures as Jackson, Wilson, and Franklin

¹ For a full account of the work of the Theodore Roosevelt Centennial Commission, which Congress created in 1955, and a survey of the centennial activities throughout the country, see Hermann Hagedorn, "Report of the Theodore Roosevelt Centennial Commission to the Congress of the United States" (New York, 1959). A mimeographed copy of this report, as well as various centennial articles, was provided the author through the courtesy of Mr. Leslie C. Stratton, Secretary and Director of the Theodore Roosevelt Association. See also *Interim Report of the Theodore Roosevelt Centennial Commission Relating to a Celebration in 1958 of the Hundredth Anniversary of the Birth of Theodore Roosevelt Pursuant to Public Law 183 of the Eighty-fourth Congress*, Washington, 1957.

² Some of this work was sponsored or inspired by the centennial commission and the Theodore Roosevelt Association. See, for example, Hermann Hagedorn (ed.), *The Free Citizen: A Summons to Service of the Democratic Ideal by Theodore Roosevelt*, New York, 1956 (paperback ed., 1958); Hagedorn (comp. and ed.), *The Theodore Roosevelt Treasury: A Self-Portrait from His Writings*, New York, 1957; Theodore Roosevelt Centennial Commission, *A Compilation on the Life and Career of Theodore Roosevelt Relating to the Celebration in 1958 of the Hundredth Anniversary of His Birth*, Senate Document No. 84, 85 Cong., 2 Sess., Washington, 1958; Avery Delano Andrews, "Theodore Roosevelt as Police Commissioner," *New-York Historical Society Quarterly*, XLII (April, 1958), 117-141; and Carleton Putnam, "Theodore Roosevelt: The Early Pattern," *ibid.*, XLIII (April, 1959), 237-251.

D. Roosevelt in attracting the attention of American historians.³ During the last decade and a half at least eight biographical studies of Roosevelt have been published and others are in progress.⁴ No less than forty articles and essays, ranging from a discussion of his ancestry to an analysis of his rhetoric,⁵ have appeared during the same period, as well as a superb eight-volume selection from his letters, several unpublished Ph.D. dissertations, and scores of collateral works.

Of course, the irrepressible "Teddy" has long fascinated students of the American past, but this hardly explains the new interest in him. A part of the answer is the peculiar attraction the progressive movement has come to have for historians in this country. Roosevelt was so intimately associated with American progressivism that the subject can scarcely be considered without giving attention to his involvement in it. Another reason historians have focused attention on Roosevelt and the era he dominated is the renewed interest in his foreign policy, which has taken on new meaning when examined in the light of two world wars and recent international developments. No doubt more subtle influences manifested in the nation's dominant mood of late are also involved. It is possible, for instance, that the homogenizing forces so apparent in modern American society, and especially the desire to avoid social conflict, have found confirmation and inspiration in Theodore Roosevelt's basic attitudes.

In one respect recent Rooseveltian historiography has been curiously unproductive. There has been no full-length biography of Roosevelt during the last fifteen years, a circumstance which provides remarkable testimony to the powerful influence and durability

³ For three provocative historiographical essays, see Charles Grier Sellers, Jr., "Andrew Jackson versus the Historians," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* (MVHR hereinafter), XLIV (March, 1958), 615-634; Richard L. Watson, Jr., "Woodrow Wilson and His Interpreters, 1947-1957," *ibid.* (September, 1957), 207-236; and Watson, "Franklin D. Roosevelt in Historical Writing, 1950-1957," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, LVII (Winter, 1958), 104-126.

⁴ At the time this essay was completed, in the fall of 1959, Howard K. Beale, William H. Harbaugh, and Carleton Putnam were engaged in writing biographies of Roosevelt. The untimely death of Professor Beale late in 1959 interrupted a long and thorough preparation for the writing of what promised to be the definitive biography of Theodore Roosevelt. Howard Beale's long quest thus becomes a tragic and unfinished chapter in American historiography.

⁵ At least two of these articles proved too esoteric for the author to make anything of: Nora E. Cordingley's "Extreme Rarities in the Published Works of Theodore Roosevelt," *Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America*, XXXIX (1945), 20-50, and Dick Spencer, III, "Teddy Roosevelt's Sadale," *Western Horseman*, January, 1958.

of Henry F. Pringle's brilliantly-written biography.⁶ One of the centennial studies, Edward Wagenknecht's *The Seven Worlds of Theodore Roosevelt* (New York, 1958), attempts to distill the essence of Roosevelt's thought and to delineate the character of his leadership.⁷ Although it is well-written and assimilates many of the new interpretations, it is lacking in critical judgment and its topical organization allows one to appreciate neither the fascinating story of Roosevelt's over-all growth nor the vital relationship between the man and his times. Another recent volume, Hermann Hagedorn's *The Roosevelt Family of Sagamore Hill* (New York, 1954), is a warm and entertaining account of the Roosevelt family at its Long Island home, but it is not much concerned with politics or Roosevelt's public career.⁸ A suggestive unpublished study by David Francis Sadler deals with the images of Roosevelt in the minds of his contemporaries.⁹

The most detailed study yet made of Theodore Roosevelt's youth and early career is the first volume of Carleton Putnam's projected four-volume biography.¹⁰ Putnam's readable and well-documented work limns the first twenty-eight years of the New Yorker's life in rich detail. Putnam emphasizes the influence of Theodore's father in the formation of the future President's character and ideals,¹¹ describes "Teedie's" youthful enthusiasm for na-

⁶ *Theodore Roosevelt: A Biography*, New York, 1931. Even at the time of its publication, Pringle's biography had certain obvious limitations. The treatment of the post-presidential years, for which Pringle did not have access to the Roosevelt Papers, was thin and some aspects of the earlier period were inadequately developed. The book's great merit lay in its appraisal of Roosevelt's presidency and in its attempt to explain the man. Pringle could never quite bring himself to regard Roosevelt as anything more than a "violently adolescent person." In a revised version of the biography, published in paperback in 1956, Pringle faithfully adheres to his earlier interpretation.

⁷ The "seven worlds" Wagenknecht discusses are those of action, thought, human relations, family, spiritual values, public affairs, and war and peace.

⁸ William Davison Johnston's *TR, Champion of the Strenuous Life: A Photographic Biography of Theodore Roosevelt*, New York, 1958, is notable for its excellent photographs. The commentary is slight. In the same genre is Stefan Lorant's *The Life and Times of Theodore Roosevelt*, New York, 1959. It assembles a large number of pictures, cartoons, diaries, and letters to enliven the "life" and "times."

⁹ "Theodore Roosevelt: A Symbol to Americans, 1898-1912," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1954. The major aspects of the Roosevelt symbol, according to Sadler, were violence, work, righteousness, and corruption (the unprincipled and tyrannical Roosevelt).

¹⁰ *Theodore Roosevelt: The Formative Years, 1858-1886*, New York, 1958.

¹¹ Putnam provides considerable family background, but the best treatment of Roosevelt's forebears is Howard K. Beale, "Theodore Roosevelt's Ancestry, A Study in Heredity," *New York Genealogical and Biographical Record*, LXXXV (October, 1954), 196-205. For some further account of earlier Roosevelts in America, see William T. Cobb, *The Strenu-*

turalism,¹² discusses the physical regimen he prescribed for himself, brings the shadowy Alice Lee to life, does a workmanlike job in covering Roosevelt's legislative career, and deals effectively and at length with his ranching and hunting experiences.¹³ He stresses Roosevelt's understanding of politics, his sense of *noblesse oblige*, his passion for law and order, his belief in individual self-responsibility, and the courage and determination he showed in developing his mind and body. But Putnam's portrait of the young Roosevelt is unduly flattering. If Pringle overemphasized the adolescent and foolish in Roosevelt's character, Putnam goes too far in depicting him as a responsible, mature, and purposeful young man. His volume is also open to other criticisms. It is largely descriptive, the space given to some topics to the relative neglect of others is open to question, and the author is not always critical in his use of sources. Nevertheless, *The Formative Years* provides for the first time a fairly complete and reliable factual account of Roosevelt's youth and early career. Nowhere outside of his own papers can one find so comprehensive a reconstruction of his early life.

Several recent articles and essays treat various aspects of Roosevelt's career before his elevation to the presidency in 1901. Elwyn B. Robinson and Robert W. Sellen have written perceptive articles on Roosevelt the historian;¹⁴ Ari Hoogenboom, in an enlightening

ous Life: The "Oyster Bay" Roosevelts in Business and Finance, New York, 1946.

¹² Paul Russell Cutright, *Theodore Roosevelt the Naturalist*, New York, 1956, is an interesting study by a zoologist of Roosevelt's outdoor life. Broadus F. Farrar, "John Burroughs, Theodore Roosevelt, and the Nature Fakers," *Tennessee Studies in Literature*, IV (1959), 121-130, throws light on the nature-faker controversy during Roosevelt's presidency but does not elaborate Roosevelt's contributions.

¹³ Several recent articles have also illuminated some of the obscure features of Roosevelt's experiences in the Badlands. Significant for the light it throws on his experience in the open-range cattle industry is Ray H. Mattison, "Roosevelt and the Stockmen's Association," *North Dakota History*, XVII (April, 1950), 73-95, and *ibid.* (July, 1950), 177-209. See also Gerry Nelson, "Roosevelt Ranch Life in the Badlands," *ibid.*, XXIV (October, 1957), 171-174; Ray H. Mattison, "Ranching in the Dakota Badlands: A Study of Roosevelt's Contemporaries," *ibid.*, XIX (April, 1952), 93-128, and *ibid.* (July, 1952), 167-206; Olaf T. Hagen and Ray H. Mattison, "Pyramid Park—Where Roosevelt Came to Hunt," *ibid.*, XIX (October, 1952), 215-239; and Chester L. Brooks and Ray H. Mattison, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Dakota Badlands*, Washington, 1958. The last item is a sixty-page illustrated booklet issued by the National Park Service. For an interesting note on Roosevelt's influence on Owen Wister, see Don D. Walker, "Wister, Roosevelt and James: A Note on the Western," *American Quarterly*, XII (Fall, 1960), 358-366.

¹⁴ Robinson, "Theodore Roosevelt: Amateur Historian," *North Dakota History*, XXV (January, 1958), 5-13; Sellen, "Theodore Roosevelt: Historian with a Moral," *Mid-America*, XLI (October, 1959), 223-240. Putnam gives an interesting evaluation of *The Naval War of 1812* and of the biography of Thomas Hart Benton in *The Formative Years*, 221-227, 574-579. For two older surveys of Roosevelt's work as a historian, see Har-

analysis of the effect the Pendleton Act had on the civil service, advances convincing proof of the New Yorker's genuine contributions to civil service reform;¹⁵ and Clifford P. Westermeier's book on the cowboy volunteers of 1898 contains an appraisal of the war feats of Roosevelt and the Rough Riders.¹⁶ One of the best unpublished studies of Roosevelt is a dissertation on his governorship by G. Wallace Chessman.¹⁷ This is an informed work that does much to explain the complicated political scene in New York near the end of the century¹⁸ and to illuminate Roosevelt's relations

rison John Thornton, "Theodore Roosevelt," in William T. Hutchinson (ed.), *The Marcus W. Jernegan Essays in American Historiography*, Chicago, 1937, 227-251, and Raymond C. Miller, "Theodore Roosevelt, Historian," in James Lea Cate and Eugene N. Anderson (eds.), *Medieval and Historiographical Essays in Honor of James Westfall Thompson*, Chicago, 1938, 423-438. George B. Utley, "Theodore Roosevelt's *The Winning of the West*: Some Unpublished Letters," *MVHR*, XXX (March, 1944), 495-506, contains an interesting exchange of letters between Roosevelt and William Frederick Poole with respect to Poole's discerning review of the first two volumes of *The Winning of the West*. Charles Fenton's article on "Theodore Roosevelt as an American Man of Letters," *Western Humanities Review*, XIII (Autumn, 1959), 369-374, is an account of T.R.'s election to the American Academy of Arts and Letters and of his association with its members.

¹⁵ "The Pendleton Act and the Civil Service," *American Historical Review* (AHR hereinafter), LXIV (January, 1959), 301-318. For an extremely critical estimate of Roosevelt's service as commissioner, see A. Bower Sageser, *The First Two Decades of the Pendleton Act: A Study of Civil Service Reform*, University Studies of the University of Nebraska, XXXIV-XXXV (Lincoln, 1935), especially 141-142.

¹⁶ *Who Rush to Glory, the Cowboy Volunteers of 1898: Grigsby's Cowboys, Roosevelt's Rough Riders, Torrey's Rocky Mountain Riders*, Caldwell, Idaho, 1958. For other accounts of the Rough Riders, see Clifford P. Westermeier, "Teddy's Terrors: The New Mexican Volunteers of 1898," *New Mexico Historical Review*, XXVII (April, 1952), 107-136, and Royal A. Prentice, "The Rough Riders," *ibid.*, XXVI (October, 1951), 261-276, and *ibid.*, XXVII (January, 1952), 29-50. Laurin Hall Healy and Luis Kutner give a journalistic account of T.R.'s relations with Admiral Dewey in *The Admiral*, New York, 1944. Frank Freidel, *The Splendid Little War*, Boston, 1958, is a new and magnificently illustrated treatment of the Spanish-American War told mainly in the words of contemporaries.

¹⁷ "Theodore Roosevelt, Governor," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1950.

¹⁸ For an interesting autobiographical account of Roosevelt's relations with the reformers who sought to nominate him on an independent ticket in 1898, see Julius Henry Cohen, *They Built Better Than They Knew*, New York, 1946. On this episode and its unpleasant consequences, see also "Note on Roosevelt's Nomination for the Governorship," in Elting E. Morison (ed.), *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, 8 vols., Cambridge, 1951-1954, II, 1474-1478; these volumes will be cited hereinafter as Morison, *Letters*. In regard to Roosevelt's behavior in 1900, Chessman argues convincingly that the New Yorker did not "set his course" in an effort to end up on the national ticket that year. See Chessman's article on "Theodore Roosevelt's Campaign against the Vice-Presidency," *Historian*, XIV (Spring, 1952), 173-190. Bascom N. Timmons, *Portrait of An American: Charles G. Dawes*, New York, 1953, which is based on Dawes' diaries, contains some interesting material on the Republican convention of 1900 and on Roosevelt's presidency.

with the legislature and with Boss Platt. The author rightly concludes that the years of Roosevelt's governorship were crucial ones for the Rough Rider. It was on the testing ground of the governorship that he clarified and strengthened his fundamental ideas on the role of the state in modern society and the relationship of the political party to government and the people.¹⁹

As might be expected, Roosevelt's presidency has been one of the principal attractions for modern Roosevelt scholars. Although no one has written an over-all appraisal of Roosevelt's presidential years as comprehensive as Pringle's, the period has been dealt with extensively in monographs, articles, and biographies of other major figures. Three studies are particularly significant: George E. Mowry, *The Era of Theodore Roosevelt, 1900-1912* (New York, 1958), Howard K. Beale, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power* (Baltimore, 1956), and John Morton Blum, *The Republican Roosevelt* (Cambridge, 1954). Mowry's book is the best general account of Roosevelt's administration.²⁰ It contains an excellent appraisal of Roosevelt. Beale's study, vigorously written and based on exhaustive research,²¹ is a comprehensive and critical examination of Roosevelt's policies in the international sphere. Beale clearly demonstrates Roosevelt's skill in handling foreign relations but questions the wisdom of his major policies. Blum, who prepared himself well for undertaking an interpretative study of Roosevelt during his years as associate editor of *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*,²² has written an exciting essay that clarifies "the purposes and methods" of Roosevelt's career. It has probably done more than any other publication since 1945 to re-

¹⁹ Chessman stresses Roosevelt's "impartial" approach to the complicated labor world that existed in the Empire State in the 1890's. A more critical appraisal of Roosevelt's labor policies is Howard Lawrence Hurwitz, *Theodore Roosevelt and Labor in New York State, 1880-1900*, New York, 1943.

²⁰ Among general books on the period a good supplement to *The Era of Theodore Roosevelt* is Harold U. Faulkner, *The Decline of Laissez Faire, 1897-1917*, New York, 1951, which concentrates on economic institutions and their development. Matthew Josephson, *The President Makers: The Culture of Politics and Leadership in An Age of Enlightenment, 1896-1919*, New York, 1940, is also useful.

²¹ The citations and evaluations in Beale's voluminous notes provide an excellent bibliographical guide to the primary and secondary materials for a study of Roosevelt's foreign policy; this volume will be cited hereinafter as *Roosevelt and World Power*.

²² A substantial part of Blum's book first appeared in various appendixes to the edited letters. See "Theodore Roosevelt: The Years of Decision," in Morison, *Letters*, II, 1484-1494; "Theodore Roosevelt and the Legislative Process: Tariff Revision and Railroad Regulation, 1904-1906," *ibid.*, IV, 1333-1342; and "Theodore Roosevelt and the Hepburn Act: Toward An Orderly System of Control," *ibid.*, VI, 1558-1571.

habilitate Roosevelt as an important and able leader.²³ Blum pictures Roosevelt as a skillful conservative more concerned with the processes than with the ends of government; but a conservative who accepted change as the only means of preserving his nation's most cherished institutions.

Another interpretative essay is Richard Hofstadter's sketch in *The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It* (New York, 1948). This piece, which gives evidence of Hofstadter's interest in psychology, reminds one of Pringle in its skeptical approach and caustic characterization. Hofstadter refers to Roosevelt as the "stabilizer of the status quo," the "master therapist of the middle classes." He emphasizes the tension, the penchant for violence, the uneasiness over radicalism, and the tendency to straddle in Roosevelt's life, while minimizing his reform accomplishments as President and suggesting that his militarism and imperialism had much in common with recent authoritarianism.²⁴ Another critical estimate of Roosevelt appeared in Peter R. Levin, *Seven by Chance: The Accidental Presidents* (New York, 1948). Levin stresses the discrepancy between the faith Roosevelt preached and the works he accomplished.²⁵

An indirect but significant contribution to recent Rooseveltian historiography is the increasing number of able biographies of Roosevelt's political associates and contemporaries. The most impressive biographical studies have been those devoted to the lives of leading congressional figures, particularly Senators. The best of these are John A. Garraty's *Henry Cabot Lodge: A Biography* (New York, 1953), which throws light on the thirty-five-year political collaboration between Lodge and Roosevelt and on Massachusetts politics but fails to elaborate Lodge's attitude toward the Square Deal and his role during the troubled years 1910-1912;²⁶

²³ On this point see Howard K. Beale's review in *MVHR*, XLI (December, 1954), 539-541.

²⁴ "Theodore Roosevelt: The Conservative as Progressive," *The American Political Tradition*, 203-233. It is interesting to note—and perhaps a commentary on the dominant interpretations in recent Rooseveltian historiography—that in *The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R.*, New York, 1955, Hofstadter was much less critical of Roosevelt. He still spoke of his using "the rhetoric of progressivism" to win the plaudits of the reformers, but he now viewed Roosevelt as one of the most astute and discerning leaders of the period, and he found much significance in the reforms of his presidency (pp. 13, 232-238, 243-251).

²⁵ *Seven by Chance*, 177-230, 353-354, 357-358. Gerald W. Johnson's *Incredible Tale: The Odyssey of the Average American in the Last Half Century*, New York, 1950, a survey of the American scene since 1900, devotes a pungent chapter to Roosevelt.

²⁶ Karl Schriftgiesser, *The Gentleman from Massachusetts: Henry Cabot Lodge*, Boston, 1944, presents a sharply critical view of Lodge.

Everett Walters' *Joseph Benson Foraker: An Uncompromising Republican* (Columbus, Ohio, 1948), a good study of a conservative who differed with the President over railroad regulation, patronage, administration policies in the Caribbean, and the Brownsville affray;²⁷ Belle Case and Fola La Follette, *Robert M. La Follette, June 14, 1855-June 18, 1925* (2 vols., New York, 1953), a detailed and sympathetic account of the Wisconsin progressive's long career which views the latter years of Roosevelt's administration from the perspective of a man whose experiences with the Rough Rider were disillusioning;²⁸ Oscar Doane Lambert, *Stephen Benton Elkins* (Pittsburgh, 1955); Leland L. Sage, *William Boyd Allison: A Study in Practical Politics* (Iowa City, 1956); and Thomas Richard Ross, *Jonathan Prentiss Dolliver: A Study in Political Integrity and Independence* (Iowa City, 1958). The last three volumes are helpful in understanding the railroad regulatory legislation of the Roosevelt period, and the studies of the Iowans are especially valuable because of the way in which they relate Iowa politics to national developments. Although there is still no adequate study of Joseph G. Cannon's public career, Blair Bolles' sprightly-written *Tyrant from Illinois* contributes to an understanding of his speakership and his relations with Roosevelt.²⁹

The members of Roosevelt's Cabinet have not attracted recent biographers. Since 1945 only one such study has appeared: Richard W. Leopold's *Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition* (Boston, 1954).³⁰ Leopold deals incisively with Root's important work in

²⁷ For two important articles on the Brownsville episode and its political repercussions, see James A. Tinsley, "Roosevelt, Foraker, and the Brownsville Affray," *Journal of Negro History*, XLI (January, 1956), 43-65, and Emma Lou Thornbrough, "The Brownsville Episode and the Negro Vote," *MVHR*, XLIV (December, 1957), 469-493.

²⁸ John R. Lambert, *Arthur Pue Gorman*, Baton Rouge, 1953, is an able study of a Democratic Senate leader. It is informative on Gorman's efforts to line up Democratic opposition in the Senate to Roosevelt's Panamanian coup.

²⁹ *Tyrant from Illinois: Uncle Joe Cannon's Experiment with Personal Power*, New York, 1951. Bolles has probably exaggerated Cannon's importance in his thesis that the Speaker's obdurate use of his powerful position to oppose reform measures was a major factor in the ultimate triumph of the progressives. William Rea Gwinn, *Uncle Joe Cannon, Arch-foe of Insurgency: A History of the Rise and Fall of Cannonism*, n.p., 1957, is a sympathetic appraisal of Cannon which fails to develop in a systematic and coherent fashion important aspects of Cannonism that it seeks to encompass.

³⁰ Although less interpretative than Leopold's book, Philip C. Jessup, *Elihu Root*, 2 vols., New York, 1938, is more revealing in the light it throws on domestic issues and on Root's relations with Roosevelt. This biography, which is sympathetic in approach, lavish in detail, and scholarly in execution, remains one of the most valuable studies of a major Roosevelt figure.

the Cabinet and stresses his contribution to the conservative tradition in America. But his book contains few references to politics and fails to do justice to Root's views on the Square Deal.³¹ Other recent biographies that should be mentioned are Ira V. Brown's *Lyman Abbott, Christian Evolutionist: A Study in Religious Liberalism* (Cambridge, 1953), which is helpful for its discussion of the relations between Roosevelt and a high-minded reformer whose independent journal consistently supported Rooseveltian policies,³² and Merlo J. Pusey's *Charles Evans Hughes* (2 vols., New York, 1951), a lengthy but uncritical biography of the inscrutable New York reformer and jurist.³³ Walter Johnson's sparkling biography of William Allen White presents a vivid account of the Emporia editor's long association with Roosevelt and some valuable material on politics in Kansas during the Roosevelt era.³⁴

No one has made a more penetrating analysis of Roosevelt's presidential politics than John M. Blum, who graphically demonstrates that the Rough Rider's proficiency in the processes of politics, administration, and legislation stamped him as "professional." By 1900, writes Blum, the New Yorker's party regularity had become "convincingly habitual," his utilization of the mechanics of power

³¹ Eric F. Goldman, *Charles J. Bonaparte, Patrician Reformer: His Earlier Career*, Baltimore, 1943, is an interesting but incomplete biography of a man who served in several minor national positions during the first years of Roosevelt's presidency and subsequently as Secretary of the Navy and Attorney General. Unfortunately, Goldman's book does not deal with Bonaparte's work as Attorney General. For an appraisal of the Cabinet careers of Roosevelt's Postmasters General—Henry C. Payne, George B. Cortelyou, and George von Lengerke Meyer—see Dorothy Ganfield Fowler, *The Cabinet Politician: The Postmasters General, 1829-1909*, New York, 1943, 262-302.

³² Brown's excellent biography also throws light on Roosevelt's work as a contributing editor of *Outlook*. For Roosevelt's relations with a powerful financier and a wayward Democrat, see Frederick Lewis Allen's *The Great Pierpont Morgan*, New York, 1948, and James McGurkin's *Bourke Cockran: A Free Lance in American Politics*, New York, 1948.

³³ The small volume by Dexter Perkins in the Library of American Biography—*Charles Evans Hughes and American Democratic Statesmanship*, Boston, 1956—makes out a case for Hughes as a farsighted middle-of-the-road leader, but it does not achieve the interpretative excellence of Leopold's study of Root in the same series. Important for an understanding of Hughes' governorship, Rooseveltian politics in New York, and progressivism in the Republican party of that state, is Herbert Hillel Rosenthal, "The Progressive Movement in New York State, 1906-1914," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1955.

³⁴ *William Allen White's America*, New York, 1947. Two memoirs that are disappointing for the Roosevelt period are *Fighting Liberal: The Autobiography of George W. Norris*, New York, 1945, and *American Chronicle: The Autobiography of Ray Stannard Baker*, New York, 1945. Two nostalgic memoirs by members of the Roosevelt family—*A Front Row Seat*, Norman, Okla., 1953, by Nicholas Roosevelt, and *Day Before Yesterday: The Reminiscences of Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.*, Garden City, 1959—provide some account of Roosevelt and his home life.

"smoothly effectual," and his standards of executive efficiency "refreshingly rigorous."³⁵ Blum illuminates the course T.R. followed in transforming the party of Hanna and McKinley into the party of Roosevelt,³⁶ and shows how Roosevelt, with an intuitive understanding of politics and an "absolute sense of political pitch," captured the loyalty of the people as had no incumbent President since Andrew Jackson.³⁷ Although Roosevelt sought to control rather than to change the American political system, his vivid performance and his success in persuading the people that he had "a conscience and would be fair" gave a powerful impetus to the reform movements of the early part of the twentieth century and provided "an irrepressible force" for the mandate of 1904.³⁸

Theodore Roosevelt's role in the revivification of the presidency has been described by Arthur S. Link as "the most significant political development of the time."³⁹ Several scholars have shown how Roosevelt's "stewardship theory" of the presidency, his role as a policy determiner in the legislative field, and his assertion of national leadership through control of public opinion contributed to

³⁵ *The Republican Roosevelt*, 22.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 37-54. M. R. Merrill, "Theodore Roosevelt and Reed Smoot," *Western Political Quarterly*, IV (September, 1951), 440-453, discusses Roosevelt's support of the conservative Mormon Senator, whose faction opposed Hanna, and Smoot's enthusiastic support of Roosevelt in 1904. For Roosevelt's southern policy, see Basil Mathews, *Booker T. Washington: Educator and Interracial Interpreter*, Cambridge, 1948, 229-234; Samuel R. Spencer, Jr., *Booker T. Washington and the Negro's Place in American Life*, Boston, 1955, 133-138, 168-169; John Hope Franklin, *From Slavery to Freedom: A History of American Negroes*, rev. ed., New York, 1956, 426-428, 434-435, 445; and Dewey W. Grantham, Jr., "Dinner at the White House: Theodore Roosevelt, Booker T. Washington, and the South," *Tennessee Historical Quarterly*, XVII (June, 1958), 112-130.

³⁷ For an interesting and thoughtful analysis of Roosevelt's rhetoric, see William A. Behl, "Theodore Roosevelt's Principles of Speech Preparation and Delivery," *Speech Monographs*, XII (1945), 112-122. This article is based on Behl's "The Rhetoric of Theodore Roosevelt," Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1942.

³⁸ Blum, *The Republican Roosevelt*, 55-72. Two brief surveys of the politics of the Roosevelt administration are contained in Eugene H. Roseboom, *A History of Presidential Elections*, New York, 1957, and Malcolm Moos, *The Republicans: A History of Their Party*, New York, 1956. Russell B. Nye, *Midwestern Progressive Politics: A Historical Study of Its Origins and Development, 1870-1950*, East Lansing, 1951, is valuable for its treatment of the relationship between Roosevelt and the midwestern progressives. Charles W. Stein, *The Third-Term Tradition: Its Rise and Collapse in American Politics*, New York, 1943, includes a discussion of Roosevelt and the third-term issue. Three articles that throw some light on the Rough Rider's western political trips are Frederic C. Smith, "Teddy Roosevelt in Iowa," *Palimpsest*, XXIX (October, 1948), 296-302; Robert P. Wilkins, "Theodore Roosevelt and 'Dacotah': A Mutual Disillusionment," *North Dakota Quarterly*, XXVI (Spring, 1958), 53-64; and Agnes Wright Spring, "Theodore Roosevelt in Colorado," *Colorado Magazine*, XXXV (October, 1958), 241-265.

³⁹ Wilson: *The New Freedom*, Princeton, 1956, 146-147.

the strengthening of the American presidency.⁴⁰ Blum's *The Republican Roosevelt* provides the best analysis of that contribution. Blum's brilliant dissection of Roosevelt's quest for and use of power, and his treatment of T.R.'s approach to his party and to the people, of the methods he employed in dealing with Congress, and of the concerts of power he worked to establish in the international sphere constitute a series of instructive case studies.

In a superb chapter on the enactment of the Hepburn Act, Blum illustrates Roosevelt's facility in dealing with Congress and the nature of his approach to governmental control over industrial operations.⁴¹ He was given to moral solutions and the dimensions of his morality, Blum says, involved practicality, popularity, and especially preoccupation with process. Having defined the tariff as a matter of expediency and the regulation of railroad rates as a matter of conduct (and morality for him was largely a matter of conduct), Roosevelt used "the specter of tariff agitation" to threaten the Old Guard and create a controlled environment within his party conducive to rate reform.⁴² He brought "a new respectability" to demands that went back to Populist days, and by mobilizing the full powers of his office he won an outstanding victory. Blum effectively refutes an interpretation that once had a good deal of currency which held that Nelson W. Aldrich outmaneuvered Roosevelt in the Hepburn fight.⁴³ Leland L. Sage's *William Boyd*

⁴⁰ Edward S. Corwin, *The President, Office and Powers, 1787-1957: History and Analysis of Practice and Opinion*. 4th rev. ed., New York, 1957, 120, 137, 152-153, 265-268; Corwin, "The Presidency in Perspective," *Journal of Politics*, XI (February, 1949), 11; Wilfred E. Binkley, "The President and Congress," *ibid.*, 71; Binkley, *President and Congress*, New York, 1947, 191-198. See also Clinton Rossiter, *The American Presidency*, New York, 1956, 76-77, and "The President and Labor Disputes," *Journal of Politics*, XI (February, 1949), 95.

⁴¹ *The Republican Roosevelt*, 73-105.

⁴² In effect, says Blum, Roosevelt sacrificed tariff reform, which he never considered worth a fight, in return for co-operation in the enactment of his railroad bill. Since some Republican rate reformers in Congress were also protectionists, Blum may have exaggerated the extent to which Roosevelt's railroad legislation involved a conflict between high-tariff, pro-railroad conservatives and low-tariff, anti-railroad liberals. George E. Mowry says that Roosevelt never gave up entirely on the tariff question and that his occasional use of the issue against the conservatives was more in the nature of "counterpunching than of shadowboxing." *The Era of Theodore Roosevelt*, 200. A critical view of Roosevelt on this issue is Richard Cleveland Baker, *The Tariff under Roosevelt and Taft*, Hastings, Nebr., 1941. Wilfred E. Binkley suggested several years before the appearance of Blum's book that Roosevelt used the tariff in situations like the Hepburn fight "for the sheer purpose of getting bargaining advantages." See Binkley, *President and Congress*, 197.

⁴³ This thesis was most persuasively advanced by Nathaniel Wright Stephenson in his *Nelson W. Aldrich: A Leader in American Politics*, New York, 1930, 280-318. Leon Burr Richardson, *William E. Chandler: Republi-*

Allison and Thomas R. Ross's *Jonathan Prentiss Dolliver* support Blum's interpretation and help to clear up the complicated maneuverings in the struggle between Roosevelt and Aldrich that preceded the Senate passage of the Hepburn bill.⁴⁴

Another aspect of Roosevelt's approach to the problem of industrial control—trustbusting—has been the focal point of considerable historical attention since 1945. Richard Hofstadter suggested in *The American Political Tradition* that antitrust action for T.R. was partly a means of satisfying the popular demand to see the government punish big business, but chiefly a threat to hold over business to compel it to accept regulation, which was really Roosevelt's solution for the trust problem.⁴⁵ In his volume in the New American Nation Series, George E. Mowry agrees substantially with this interpretation. With the path to effective control blocked by a stubborn, conservative Congress, Roosevelt was forced to bring "the arrogant capitalists to heel" through the judicious use of the antitrust laws.⁴⁶ Hans B. Thorelli's comprehensive study of the formative period of antitrust policy, *The Federal Antitrust Policy:*

can, New York, 1940, provides a good account of Chandler's role as Roosevelt's intermediary in working with the Senate Democrats led by Benjamin R. Tillman. Richardson and Francis Butler Simkins both criticize Roosevelt for a lack of good faith in his dealings with Chandler, Tillman, and the Democrats. For the South Carolinian's part in the railroad rate struggle and his long hostility toward Roosevelt, see Simkins, *Pitchfork Ben Tillman*, *South Carolinian*, Baton Rouge, 1944, 400-401, 408-454.

⁴⁴ Ross emphasizes Dolliver's contribution in getting the Hepburn bill out of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce and argues that the Iowa Senator was the "real author" of the Hepburn measure. He contradicts Stephenson's contention that Aldrich's amendment in committee, reserving the right of committee members to amend the bill on the floor of the Senate, represented a victory for Aldrich by pointing out that such an amendment was meaningless in view of the fact that committee members had always possessed this right under procedures of the upper house. It was, says Ross, only "a petty effort to lead the public to believe that the Old Guard was still in control of the committee." *Jonathan Prentiss Dolliver*, 193-213, 333-334. Blum apparently made the mistake of following Stephenson on this matter. Lambert's *Stephen Benton Elkins* is valuable for its analysis of the workings of the Elkins Act during the years 1903-1905, but overestimates Elkins' contribution to the formulation of the Hepburn bill. Richard Lowitt, "George W. Norris, James J. Hill, and the Railroad Rate Bill," *Nebraska History*, XL (June, 1959), 137-145, offers evidence that a major reason for support of Roosevelt's railroad legislation in Nebraska was the resentment at the policies James J. Hill and his associates followed in managing the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad.

⁴⁵ *The American Political Tradition*, 222. In *The Age of Reform* (p. 244), Hofstadter makes the interesting observation that the readiness with which Roosevelt's reputation as a trustbuster grew up around his use of the Sherman Act (despite his candid admissions that he did not believe in the trustbusting philosophy) offers "striking testimony to the public's need to believe in the effectiveness of action in this sphere..."

⁴⁶ *The Era of Theodore Roosevelt*, 132-134.

Origination of an American Tradition (Baltimore, 1954), while emphasizing the point that Theodore Roosevelt brought "executive initiative and leadership" to this area of public policy-making, insists that there was no well-defined and coherent Roosevelt plan during the early years of his presidency. Before 1903, declares Thorelli, there was nothing in Roosevelt's program *per se* "that is in conflict with the antimonopoly tradition, although it is implied that the antitrust policy might need reinforcement or supplementation."⁴⁷

Intrigued by the possibilities of federal power, Roosevelt moved toward a system of orderly control, first by establishing the Bureau of Corporations in the Department of Commerce and Labor to discipline consolidation. The power thus granted to an agency under the control of the Chief Executive was potentially very great and, though Roosevelt intended to rely upon experts in carrying on the work of the Bureau, John M. Blum has suggested that the open environment provided by the legislative or judicial processes might have been a more equitable approach to the problems of competition, consolidation, and control.⁴⁸ An important article by Arthur M. Johnson on Roosevelt's role in the establishment and early work of the Bureau lends support to Blum's reservations about the Rough Rider's solution to this problem.⁴⁹ Johnson concludes that the agency proved useful to Roosevelt in publicizing corporate abuses and in helping to prosecute offenders, but that its performance was uneven and its susceptibility to influence by the President constantly invited arbitrary distinctions between "good" and "bad" combinations. Such an arrangement, he says, was "too patently inconsistent with sound public policy to be institutionalized."⁵⁰ In another recent article Robert H. Wiebe has shown

⁴⁷ *The Federal Antitrust Policy*, 411-431, 528-554, 560-561, 592-593. Thorelli's coverage ends with 1903, but his study contains much valuable material on the administration and enforcement of the Sherman Act, judicial interpretation, and the trust problem in Congress during the first two years of Roosevelt's presidency.

⁴⁸ *The Republican Roosevelt*, 6, 116-121. "The conclusion imperiously suggests itself," writes Blum, "that Roosevelt did not want to be controlled, that he did not want to be inhibited by a body of law, whether or not it was properly interpreted, nor delayed by the impedance of legislatures."

⁴⁹ "Theodore Roosevelt and the Bureau of Corporations," *MVHR*, XLV (March, 1959), 571-590. Johnson is inclined to see more coherence in Roosevelt's early presidential policies for the handling of big business than is Thorelli.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 589-590. For the main points in an interesting paper on "The Antitrust Law, 1901-1909," which Johnson delivered at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association in 1958, see C. E. Black, "The Washington Meeting, 1958," *AHR*, LXIV (April, 1959), 794.

how the House of Morgan negotiated "gentlemen's agreements" with the Roosevelt administration and thereby removed the United States Steel Corporation and the International Harvester Company from the scourge of antitrust prosecution.⁵¹

Several books and articles published since 1945 have clarified other features of Roosevelt's Square Deal. Robert J. Cornell, *The Anthracite Coal Strike of 1902* (Washington, 1957), a monograph based on extensive research, provides an excellent account of the strike and of Roosevelt's part in forcing a settlement.⁵² *The Health of a Nation: Harvey W. Wiley and the Fight for Pure Food* (Chicago, 1958), a carefully-prepared study by Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., concentrates on Wiley but also deals with Roosevelt's role in the fight for pure-food and drug legislation. Anderson shows Roosevelt to have been a "late convert" to the crusade for pure-food legislation, but his book does not underestimate the President's substantial contribution to the passage of the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906.⁵³

Although there is still no adequate treatment of Roosevelt and the conservation movement, his policies in that field have not been altogether neglected during the last few years. Gifford Pinchot's *Breaking New Ground* (New York, 1947), while particularly concerned with the story of forest conservation in the United States, describes the various elements in Roosevelt's comprehensive conservation program.⁵⁴ An article by Whitney R. Cross on "The Conservation Policies of the Two Roosevelts" thoughtfully analyzes the

⁵¹ "The House of Morgan and the Executive, 1905-1913," *AHR*, LXV (October, 1959), 49-60. This article and another by Wiebe on "Business Disunity and the Progressive Movement, 1901-1914," *MVHR*, XLIV (March, 1958), 664-685, are important for their analysis of business ideas, tactics, and conflicts during the progressive era. For a convenient selection of readings on the trust debate as it culminated in the campaign of 1912, see the small volume in the Amherst College Problems in American Civilization edited by Edwin C. Rozwenc on *Roosevelt, Wilson and the Trusts*, Boston, 1950.

⁵² Marguerite Green, *The National Civic Federation and the American Labor Movement, 1900-1925*, Washington, 1956, describes the mediation efforts of the National Civic Federation in the coal strike and covers Roosevelt's relations with the organization.

⁵³ See also Anderson's article, "The Pure-Food Issue: A Republican Dilemma, 1906-1912," *AHR*, LXI (April, 1956), 550-573, which argues that the controversies over the enforcement of the pure-food regulations and over Wiley's resignation in March, 1912, were politically significant "as one more feature in the combination of circumstances that doomed the Republicans in 1912."

⁵⁴ See also M. Nelson McGeary, *Gifford Pinchot: Forester-Politician*, Princeton, 1960. David Cushman Coyle, *Conservation: An American Story of Conflict and Accomplishment*, New Brunswick, N.J., is an undocumented account that emphasizes the work of Pinchot and T.R. in the conservation movement.

first Roosevelt's conservation ideas.⁵⁵ Cross points out that Theodore Roosevelt's support of conservation was a congenial commitment on his part because it allowed him to stress convictions of honesty and efficiency that were firmly fixed in the American tradition. Cross contends that specific conservation problems "on their own merits" gradually led originally individualistic predispositions to evolve in "the collectivist direction," that through his conservation program Roosevelt came to assume a consistent and pervasive antimonopoly position, and that the inadequacy of simple righteousness in dealing with complicated and highly technical violations promoted the development of a comprehensive theory of resource management. Thus was Roosevelt led along the road to the New Nationalism and an elementary stage of the welfare state, says Cross. A somewhat different view is presented in a survey of Roosevelt's conservation activities by E. C. Blackorby, who emphasizes the western sources of the Rough Rider's conservation ideas and asserts that Roosevelt's policies derived from his interpretation of the powers of the presidency and his conception of the government's function as that of a steward for later generations of Americans.⁵⁶

The most significant work on the conservation movement to appear in recent years is Samuel P. Hays, *Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920* (Cambridge, 1959), which is based on extensive use of primary materials. Hays challenges those scholars who have emphasized the democratic features and the antimonopoly spirit of the conservation movement and advances the thesis that conservation was primarily a scientific movement, concerned with rational

⁵⁵ "Ideas in Politics: The Conservation Policies of the Two Roosevelts," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XIV (June, 1953), 421-438. For a general comparison of the two Roosevelts that is critical of T.R., see R. G. Tugwell, "The Two Roosevelts," *Western Political Quarterly*, V (March, 1952), 84-93.

⁵⁶ "Theodore Roosevelt's Conservation Policies and Their Impact upon America and the American West," *North Dakota History*, XXV (October, 1958), 107-117. For two articles that throw light on the conservation movement in the Far West during the Roosevelt era, see Lawrence Rakestraw, "Uncle Sam's Forest Reserves," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, XLIV (October, 1953), 145-151, and "Before McNary: The Northwestern Conservationist, 1889-1913," *ibid.*, LI (April, 1960), 49-56. A brief article that deals with one example of the Roosevelt administration's efforts to protect the public domain is Jerry A. O'Callaghan, "Senator Mitchell and the Oregon Land Frauds, 1905," *Pacific Historical Review*, XXI (August, 1952), 255-261. For an older account that touches on the connection between Roosevelt's conservation policies and his ideas on agriculture, see Earle D. Ross, "Roosevelt and Agriculture," *MVHR*, XIV (December, 1927), 287-310.

planning to promote the efficient development and use of all natural resources.⁵⁷ He argues that instead of being a great moral struggle between the virtuous "people" and the evil "interests," the movement was primarily the work of a limited group of people with a particular set of goals. Far from involving a reaction against large-scale corporate business, asserts Hays, conservation in fact shared its views in a mutual revulsion against unrestrained competition and undirected economic development.⁵⁸ Hays' emphasis on the concept of efficiency in resource management is a significant contribution to a fuller understanding of the conservation movement, and it suggests a side of the progressive movement that needs further investigation. But the interpretation is too monolithic to explain the conservation crusade or the progressive movement entirely.

Hays is more successful in fitting the conservation policies of the Roosevelt administration into his conceptual framework. Stressing the close connection between the various elements in the larger conservation movement, he demonstrates how the Roosevelt administration expanded its public land policies and gradually broadened its early reclamation work into a full-fledged water development program and a single, coherent approach to conservation.⁵⁹ But the administration had difficulty in adjusting the conflicts that arose over resource decisions. Encountering increasing opposition from Congress, which could not appreciate the conservationists' passion for efficiency and which sought to protect its own role in the making of resource decisions, Roosevelt and his conservation friends endeavored to overcome legislative restraints by devising new administrative concepts and practices, by expanding the interpretation of resource laws, and finally, by making a bid for popular support. At this point, Hays contends,

⁵⁷ A radically different and more traditional interpretation is found in an excellent article by J. Leonard Bates, "Fulfilling American Democracy: The Conservation Movement, 1907 to 1921," *MVHR*, XLIV (June, 1957), 29-57. Bates explores the relationship between conservation and the progressive movement, and argues that the organized conservationists were concerned more with economic justice and democracy in the handling of resources than with mere prevention of waste. For this general theme, see also Roy M. Robbins, *Our Landed Heritage: The Public Domain, 1776-1936*, Princeton, 1942, 301-379. E. Louise Peffer, *The Closing of the Public Domain: Disposal and Reservation Policies, 1900-1950*, Stanford, 1951, contains a careful survey of Roosevelt's public land policies.

⁵⁸ Hays suggests that the conservation ideology stressed conservation as a theory of resource ownership when, in fact, the movement was primarily concerned with resource use. *Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency*, 1-4, 261-266.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 5-127.

middle- and upper-class urban dwellers, with little appreciation for rational and comprehensive planning, joined the conservation crusade.⁶⁰

Theodore Roosevelt's extraordinary energy, his passion for stability, his practicality and willingness to compromise, his fascination with processes rather than ends, and his devotion to the gospel of righteousness, all suggest why he should have demonstrated a flair for administration. Leonard D. White has said that as an administrator Roosevelt stood "head and shoulders above his predecessors since the days of James K. Polk."⁶¹ No published work has yet made a careful study of the twenty-sixth President as an administrator, but a Ph.D. dissertation by Joseph Teplin on his administrative thought and behavior suggests the importance of the subject.⁶² Although based only on printed materials, this is a critical study of all significant aspects of Roosevelt's administrative ideas and actions. An illuminating case study is Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.'s essay on "Theodore Roosevelt and the Panama Canal: A Study in Administration," which appeared as an appendix to *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*.⁶³ Chandler points out that Roosevelt's administrative abilities lay less in the realm of theory than in the field of practice. As a practical executive his talents were three-fold: first, he made decisions rapidly and on the basis of the best advice available; second, he understood the necessity of choosing capable men for important administrative positions, of supporting them fully, and of convincing them of the value of their work; and finally, he had learned from experience "not only that authority and responsibility must be centralized but that authority to act must be commensurate with the responsibility exacted."⁶⁴ Civil service reform, another element in the strenuous President's administrative work, has received extensive coverage in Paul P. Van Riper's history of the civil service.⁶⁵ Under Roose-

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 133-145, 275.

⁶¹ "The Public Life of 'T.R.,'" *Public Administration Review*, XIV (Autumn, 1954), 281.

⁶² "Theodore Roosevelt: A Study in Administrative Thought and Behavior," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1949.

⁶³ Morison, *Letters*, VI, 1547-1557. This essay first appeared in *Explorations in Entrepreneurial History*, IV, Cambridge, 1951, 103-111.

⁶⁴ Part IV of Gerstle Mack's *The Land Divided: A History of the Panama Canal and Other Isthmian Canal Projects*, New York, 1944, contains a useful treatment of such aspects of the canal story as medical administration, labor problems, and the role of technology. See also Miles P. DuVal, Jr., *And the Mountains Move: The Story of the Building of the Panama Canal*, Stanford University, 1947.

⁶⁵ *History of the United States Civil Service*, Evanston, Ill., and White Plains, N. Y., 1958, 176-207, 540-541.

velt's "stimulating guidance," says Van Riper, the public service first began to reflect the influence of the drive for "administrative and organizational reform."

Elting E. Morison has pointed out that Theodore Roosevelt was one of those Americans who first discerned that the country's future lay "within the whole world and not in some insulated corner."⁶⁶ His efforts to equip the nation for international maturity was a major part of his leadership and has been recognized as such by American historians. Roosevelt was unusually well-equipped to deal with foreign problems, as Howard K. Beale makes clear in his important study of Roosevelt's diplomacy. His travels abroad, his extensive reading, his friendships at home and abroad, and the sense of security and of *noblesse oblige* that he got from an aristocratic background were all important in his approach to international questions. Beale notes that the Roosevelts, unlike most of their predecessors, accepted living in the White House as "completely natural." They had the aristocrats' concern for good breeding but they blended regard for proprieties with simplicity in taste and freedom from ostentation. This facilitated Roosevelt's man-to-man diplomacy.⁶⁷

In discussing Roosevelt's part in the rise of American imperialism, Beale places emphasis on the Rough Rider's moral rectitude, his belief in Anglo-Saxon superiority,⁶⁸ and his special brand of national honor; he observes that in his ignorance of modern war Roosevelt romanticized war, and that while he valued the blessings of peace he craved the excitement of war. Beale shows that Roosevelt's desire to have his country act as a great power was intimately related to his concern for the qualities of character he prized and his feeling that expansion would help develop those

⁶⁶ *Letters*, V, xviii. A lively synthesis that covers Roosevelt diplomacy while surveying American foreign relations from 1885 to 1910, is Foster Rhea Dulles, *The Imperial Years*, New York, 1956. See also Julius W. Pratt, *America's Colonial Experiment: How the United States Gained, Governed, and in Part Gave Away a Colonial Empire*, New York, 1950.

⁶⁷ Beale, *Roosevelt and World Power*, 1-13. An interesting article by Nelson Manfred Blake examines Roosevelt's relations with the more important foreign ambassadors during his presidency and illustrates his flair for personal diplomacy. "Ambassadors at the Court of Theodore Roosevelt," *MVHR*, XLII (September, 1955), 179-206.

⁶⁸ *Roosevelt and World Power*, 14-80. Beale makes the point that Roosevelt's racism differed from that of many of his contemporaries in that he attributed differences of "race" to acquired characteristics and to the effect of geographic environment, in that he did not limit the possibilities of progress to white men, and in that he had such respect for "the sacredness of individual personality" that he judged each man as an individual human being rather than as a member of a class, a race, or a nation.

qualities in his fellow-citizens. This point is examined in an interesting article by John P. Mallan on "The Warrior Critique of the Business Civilization," which argues that the "little imperialist elite" composed of such men as Brooks Adams, Homer Lea, and Theodore Roosevelt made the only serious attempt during America's brief history as a world power to develop a genuinely conservative position on foreign policy.⁶⁹ In his study of the conflict between ideals and self-interest in the international life of the United States, Robert Endicott Osgood asserts that a group of "American Realists," motivated by "an aggressive national egoism and a romantic attachment to national power," briefly captured popular leadership under the banner of a missionary imperialism.⁷⁰ One of these realists, Theodore Roosevelt, found it easy to lead the nation to its most active participation in international affairs since the days of the French alliance; but this was not, according to Osgood, the result of any "sudden burst of realism" in the popular attitude toward world politics. Rather it should be attributed to Roosevelt's political genius, "his consummate skill in tapping the resources of aroused nationalism and directing them into new channels."⁷¹

To understand Theodore Roosevelt's views on foreign policy, one must comprehend his belief in the oneness of American and British interests and his conviction that together they could dominate the world, to the advantage of civilization. Howard K. Beale's *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power* contains an excellent account of Roosevelt's British policies. Beale does not make the mistake of interpreting Roosevelt as "an unqualified Anglophobe," but he shows how T.R. and his friends gradually developed a full-fledged foreign policy based on the belief that the two countries shared common interests. He reviews the conflicts and misunderstandings whose ultimate resolution led to the con-

⁶⁹ "Roosevelt, Brooks Adams, and Lea: The Warrior Critique of the Business Civilization," *American Quarterly*, VIII (Fall, 1956), 216-230. Mallan concludes that despite the antimaterialist or antibusiness sentiments of men like Roosevelt, Lodge, and Alfred T. Mahan, only Adams and Lea clearly saw the possible conflict between a luxury economy and military survival. On Lodge and Mahan in this connection and on their support of imperialism in general, see Garraty, *Henry Cabot Lodge*, 146-165, 180-219, and William E. Livezey, *Mahan on Sea Power*, Norman, Okla., 1947, 97-137.

⁷⁰ *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century*, Chicago, 1953, especially 27-28. A European study, based mainly on secondary sources, which views Roosevelt's diplomacy as a combination of realism and idealism, is Alex Weilenmann, *Theodore Roosevelt und die Aussenpolitik der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika*, Zurich, 1953.

⁷¹ Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest*, 70-71, 75, 84.

summation of the entente, throws new light on Roosevelt's handling of the Alaskan boundary dispute, and suggests that the President and his associates desired but never quite dared to advocate publicly an Anglo-American alliance.⁷² For all Roosevelt's prophetic insights, writes Beale, he failed to foresee the inevitable resentment of the colonial people whose domination was a major objective of the Anglo-American understanding.⁷³ Beale also criticizes Roosevelt and his colleagues for seeking in combination with Britain to preserve "an unstable balance" among the nations he considered civilized, and for their failure to inform the American people of the commitments they had made.⁷⁴

As John M. Blum's penetrating essay makes clear, Roosevelt's foreign policy was governed (as were his policies at home) by his quest for order and his faith in power.⁷⁵ Roosevelt's first objective was the self-interest of the United States and this helps account for his interest in strategic considerations and his determination to develop the American navy.⁷⁶ His quest for order and his faith in

⁷² *Roosevelt and World Power*, 81-171. An interesting treatment of Roosevelt's British diplomacy is that of H. C. Allen, *Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952)*, London, 1954, 549-626. A careful study, based on extensive research, that parallels Beale's interpretation but is somewhat more critical of Roosevelt is Charles S. Campbell, Jr., *Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903*, Baltimore, 1957. For a comprehensive review of the Alaskan boundary question, see Charles Callan Tansill, *Canadian-American Relations, 1875-1911*, New Haven, 1943.

⁷³ The confusion in Roosevelt's (and many Americans') approach to imperialism, the contradiction in his thinking about liberty and order, and his somewhat idealized conception of imperialism as the great civilizing agency for backward nations were well illustrated in 1910 during the course of several speeches he made in Egypt and England concerning British policy for administering Egypt and the Sudan. Although he urged the necessity of British control in these colonial areas, much that he said, especially in Egypt, was susceptible of favorable interpretation by the Egyptian nationalists. See David H. Burton, "Theodore Roosevelt and Egyptian Nationalism," *Mid-America*, XLI (April, 1959), 88-103.

⁷⁴ *Roosevelt and World Power*, 151, 153, 159-171, 457-458. In a paper on "Theodore Roosevelt and the British Empire," Max Beloff challenges Beale on several of these points. See *The Great Powers: Essays in Twentieth Century Politics*, London, 1959, 215-232.

⁷⁵ *The Republican Roosevelt*, 126. For a discussion of Roosevelt and the balance of power, see Edward H. Buehrig, *Woodrow Wilson and the Balance of Power*, Bloomington, Ind., 1955, 151-167.

⁷⁶ A concise and competent treatment of Roosevelt's contributions to the building of the modern American navy is Gordon Carpenter O'Gara, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of the Modern Navy*, Princeton, 1943. See also Elting E. Morison, *Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy*, Boston, 1942; Harold and Margaret Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918*, rev. ed., Princeton, 1942; and Arthur M. Johnson, "Theodore Roosevelt and the Navy," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, LXXXIV (October, 1958), 76-82. For an amusing account of Roosevelt's much-publicized General Order No. 6 on physical fitness, see Rear Admiral Lucius W. Johnson, "When T.R. Streamlined the Officers," *ibid.*, LXXVIII (December, 1952), 1310-1313.

power were perhaps most apparent in his Caribbean policies. But this area has received relatively little attention since World War II, in part perhaps because the subject had earlier been given elaborate treatment.⁷⁷ Even Beale slights Roosevelt's Caribbean diplomacy.

Most American diplomatic historians have been highly suspicious of Roosevelt's claim that he used the presence of Admiral Dewey's fleet in the Caribbean and sent a personal ultimatum to the Kaiser to force Germany's acceptance of American arbitration proposals during the Venezuelan crisis of 1902-1903.⁷⁸ In an article published in 1946, Seward W. Livermore challenged some of the conventional conclusions with regard to this episode.⁷⁹ Livermore concedes that Roosevelt might have embellished his recollection of his activities in the crisis, but the historian's examination of naval records convinced him that there exists "a substantial factual basis" for Roosevelt's statements. He thinks the key to the problem lies in the careful preparation the navy made in 1902 to defend the interests and security of the United States in the Caribbean, and in the way Roosevelt made use of American naval maneuvers in that area during the crisis for diplomatic purposes. In a fascinating exploration of the whole historiographical problem that has developed over this question, Beale goes further than Livermore in defending Roosevelt's claims. He views the affair as a notable example of Roosevelt's personal diplomacy and as important in its bearing on his "reputation for veracity."⁸⁰ He takes issue with Dexter Perkins and other historians and introduces considerable evidence to prove that "the substance" of Roosevelt's account is true.⁸¹

⁷⁷ Among the best of the numerous earlier studies are Howard C. Hill, *Roosevelt and the Caribbean*, Chicago, 1927; Dexter Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1867-1907*, Baltimore, 1937; and Samuel Flagg Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States: An Historical Interpretation*, New York, 1943.

⁷⁸ See, for example, Hill, *Roosevelt and the Caribbean*, 106-174; Alfred Vagts, *Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten in der Weltpolitik*, 2 vols., New York, 1935, II, 1525-1635; and Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1867-1907*, 319-395.

⁷⁹ "Theodore Roosevelt, the American Navy, and the Venezuelan Crisis of 1902-1903," *AHR*, LI (April, 1946), 452-471.

⁸⁰ *Roosevelt and World Power*, 395-431. Beale suggests that the "debunking" of one of Roosevelt's proudest accomplishments, "more perhaps than any other one factor," has become the basis for a growing conviction, "professional and popular," that he was something of a fraud.

⁸¹ In a review of Foster Rhea Dulles' *The Imperial Years*, Perkins indicated that he still doubts the "Roosevelt legend," and finds it significant "that there is not a word in the German archives to substantiate the story of an ultimatum...." *MVHR*, XLIV (September, 1957), 375.

Mowry's *The Era of Theodore Roosevelt* has a good brief account of Roosevelt's Far Eastern policies, but the most comprehensive study of Rooseveltian diplomacy in the Orient is contained in Beale's volume. In his chapter on Roosevelt and China, Beale examines T.R.'s handling of such problems as the dispute over the American China Development Company,⁸² shows how he miscalculated in the arrangements he made with Japan for the maintenance of the Open Door in China, and explores the implications of American imperialism with respect to that country. He is critical of Roosevelt for failing to formulate a foreign policy which would help resolve China's basic problems, and expresses the opinion that the United States missed a great opportunity during the Roosevelt era when it failed to become the friend and guide of the "new spirit" in China.⁸³ In another chapter Beale reviews in great detail Roosevelt's mediation in the Russo-Japanese War and his major policies designed to maintain the balance of power in the Far East.⁸⁴ He probably overemphasizes Roosevelt's responsibility for the ultimate failure of the balance of power and Open Door arrangements he worked so hard to perfect in the Far East.⁸⁵

⁸² For a good account of the early years of this company, see William R. Braisted, "The United States and the American China Development Company," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, XI (February, 1952), 147-165.

⁸³ *Roosevelt and World Power*, 172-252. For another critical examination of Roosevelt's policies concerning China, see Charles Vevier, *The United States and China, 1906-1913: A Study of Finance and Diplomacy*, New Brunswick, N.J., 1955, which analyzes American relations with China as they were affected by "the techniques of cooperation between Washington and Wall Street." See also Vevier, "The Open Door: An Idea in Action, 1906-1913," *Pacific Historical Review*, XXIV (February, 1955), 49-62, and Raymond A. Esthus, "The Changing Concept of the Open Door, 1899-1910," *MVHR*, XLVI (December, 1959), 435-454. Paul A. Varg, *Open Door Diplomacy: The Life of W. W. Rockhill*, Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, XXXIII, No. 4, Urbana, 1952, is also helpful for Roosevelt's Chinese policies.

⁸⁴ *Roosevelt and World Power*, 253-334. For American public opinion on the Japanese problem, see Winston B. Thorson, "Pacific Northwest Opinion on the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, XXXV (October, 1944), 305-322, and "American Public Opinion and the Portsmouth Peace Conference," *AHR*, LIII (April, 1948), 439-464. Outten Jones Clinard, *Japan's Influence on American Naval Power, 1897-1917*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1947, although based almost entirely on printed sources, is enlightening on Roosevelt's response to the upsurge of Japanese power in the Far East. For an elucidation of the American dilemma during the Roosevelt era that resulted from heavy reliance upon sea power to support the nation's Far Eastern diplomacy, in the absence of a clear-cut strategy and an adequate Pacific fleet, see William R. Braisted, "The Philippine Naval Base Problem, 1898-1909," *MVHR*, XLI (June, 1954), 21-40; "The United States Navy's Dilemma in the Pacific, 1906-1909," *Pacific Historical Review*, XXVI (August, 1957), 235-244; and *The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909*, Austin, Texas, 1958.

⁸⁵ Beale suggests that some American policies unfriendly to Japan, including the famous naval cruise around the world, encouraged the rise of the militarists in Japan. *Roosevelt and World Power*, 328-334. For

Although Roosevelt's role in European diplomacy was smaller than it was in the Far East, he was vitally interested in preserving the balance of power on that continent. He sought to avoid the outbreak of a war in Europe (which he suspected would become a general war) and in the first Moroccan crisis he played a useful part in avoiding an open conflict.⁸⁶ In his lengthy discussion of Roosevelt and the balance of power in Europe, Beale illuminates some of the hidden corners of the twenty-sixth President's notions about war and peace, and provides an especially discerning treatment of his position *vis-à-vis* Germany and the Kaiser.⁸⁷ Although Roosevelt generally turned a friendly countenance toward the Prince of Wilhelmstrasse, a recently published article by Seward W. Livermore shows how he made use of a pattern of naval-diplomatic activity to indicate American preference for the Anglo-French Entente and thus tip the balance against Germany in the precarious international situation.⁸⁸

a different view of the naval cruise, see Thomas A. Bailey, "The World Cruise of the American Battleship Fleet, 1907-1909," *Pacific Historical Review*, I (December, 1932), 389-423. Raymond A. Esthus, "The Taft-Katsura Agreement—Reality or Myth?" *Journal of Modern History*, XXXI (March, 1959), 46-51, advances persuasive evidence to prove that the Taft-Katsura agreement of 1905 was not a "secret pact," as Tyler Dennett and most later historians have interpreted the "agreed memorandum," but rather a helpful and "honest exchange of views." An older work that contributes to an understanding of one aspect of Roosevelt's dealings with the Japanese is Thomas A. Bailey, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-American Crises: An Account of the International Complications Arising from the Race Problem on the Pacific Coast*, Stanford University, 1934. The following recent studies throw light on American policies in the Far East during the Roosevelt period: Fred Harvey Harrington, *God, Mammon, and the Japanese: Dr. Horace N. Allen and Korean-American Relations, 1884-1905*, Madison, 1944; John King Fairbank, *The United States and China*, rev. ed., Cambridge, 1958; Edward H. Zabriskie, *American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East: A Study in Diplomacy and Power Politics, 1895-1914*, Philadelphia, 1946; Pauline Tompkins, *American-Russian Relations in the Far East*, New York, 1949; Thomas A. Bailey, *America Faces Russia: Russian-American Relations from Early Times to Our Day*, Ithaca, N.Y., 1950; and Edwin O. Reischauer, *The United States and Japan*, rev. ed., Cambridge, 1957.

⁸⁶ A colorful account of an earlier Rooseveltian gambit in Morocco is Barbara W. Tuchman, "'Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead,'" *American Heritage*, X (August, 1959), 18-21, 98-101.

⁸⁷ *Roosevelt and World Power*, 335-447. The American statesman got along well with the Kaiser and was often successful in his personal diplomacy with him. Privately his comments on the German ruler ranged all the way from "dislike to esteem." See Beale's interesting article, "Theodore Roosevelt, Wilhelm II. und die Deutsch-Amerikanischen Beziehungen," *Die Welt Als Geschichte*, XV (1955), 155-179.

⁸⁸ "The American Navy as a Factor in World Politics, 1903-1913," *AHR*, LXIII (July, 1958), 863-879. Livermore points up the American suspicions of German aggression in Central or South America. Thus, while Roosevelt was primarily concerned with maintaining world peace at the Algenciras Conference, the United States had a strategic interest in pre-

Several historians have pointed out the relationship between Roosevelt's domestic reforms and his purposes in the international sphere. For example, George E. Mowry has noted how the nationalist and collectivist impulse that encouraged one wing of progressivism to rely upon the federal state for the solution of internal problems also reflected itself in foreign affairs.⁸⁹ In an influential article published in 1952, William E. Leuchtenburg advanced the thesis that the progressives, with few exceptions, ardently supported imperialism or at the very least proved "agreeably acquiescent."⁹⁰ Although Leuchtenburg and other recent American specialists have clearly shown the affinity one branch of the progressives had for an imperialistic foreign policy, other historians have insisted that progressivism, especially in the Midwest and the South, was basically hostile to imperialism and the ambitious foreign policies of Theodore Roosevelt.⁹¹

Much of recent Rooseveltian scholarship has been concerned with Roosevelt and the progressive movement, with major emphasis on the years 1910-1912. The most significant volume on this subject is George E. Mowry's *Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement* (Madison, 1946), the first important work to be published on Roosevelt following World War II. The result of extensive research in manuscript sources and other records, Mowry's book is a perspicacious and well-written treatment of Roosevelt's influence on the progressive movement and the influence of the movement on the man. Mowry stresses the midwestern origins of the movement⁹² and asserts, in his evaluation of T.R.'s presidential contributions to the incipient reform wave, that "Roosevelt was the best publicity man progressivism ever had." He makes a detailed

venting Germany from obtaining control of Casablanca, which would be useful as a naval base for operations against South America. Beale emphasizes Roosevelt's desire to prevent a Franco-German war at Algiciras. He says Germany had no territorial ambitions in Latin America at the time of the Venezuelan crisis of 1902-1903. *Roosevelt and World Power*, 371, 388, 398, 430.

⁸⁹ *The Era of Theodore Roosevelt*, 144-146.

⁹⁰ "Progressivism and Imperialism: The Progressive Movement and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1916," *MVHR*, XXXIX (December, 1952), 483-504.

⁹¹ See Foster Rhea Dulles, *America's Rise to World Power, 1898-1954*, New York, 1954, 83-85, and Arthur S. Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917*, New York, 1954, 180-186. Russel B. Nye's *Midwestern Progressive Politics* is disappointing in its failure to deal more adequately with the attitudes of midwestern progressives toward international relations. This is perhaps a commentary on the midwestern progressives' lack of interest in foreign affairs.

⁹² Mowry presents a more comprehensive explanation of the origins of progressivism in the first five chapters of *The Era of Theodore Roosevelt*.

examination of the Taft administration, the various phases of insurgency,⁹³ and the gathering progressive storm in the West. He is much more critical of William Howard Taft, whom he views as a conservative and as a bungling politician, than was Henry F. Pringle.⁹⁴ He follows Roosevelt closely after his return from abroad and does much to clarify his motivations and behavior in the campaign of 1910;⁹⁵ he discusses the gradual cleavage between the ex-President and Taft, the evolution of the New Nationalism, the organization of the Progressive party, and the election of 1912. His brief account of the decline of the Progressive party is a masterly treatment. Mowry has probably overemphasized Roosevelt's role in the progressive movement, especially in his thesis that he killed progressivism in the Republican party by leading the progressives out of the party in 1912, only to abandon them in 1916. He concentrates too closely upon domestic politics and is understandably limited in his handling of the relationship between far-flung local and state activities and national developments. But his book is indispensable for an understanding of Roosevelt and the progressive movement.

During the years since 1945 the election of 1912 has continued to be a central attraction for research on progressivism. Few American elections have been studied at the grass-roots level so inten-

⁹³ Kenneth W. Hechler, *Insurgency: Personalities and Politics of the Taft Era*, New York, 1940, remains of some value as a careful account of insurgency in Congress.

⁹⁴ *The Life and Times of William Howard Taft: A Biography*, 2 vols., New York, 1939. Pringle emphasizes Taft's constructive accomplishments as President, puts the best light possible on his actions, and fully captures his charm as a human being. He is captious in his attitude toward Roosevelt in the Taft biography. Mowry takes issue with Pringle's interpretation of the Ballinger-Pinchot Controversy and adopts the general position of Alpheus Thomas Mason in *Bureaucracy Convicts Itself: The Ballinger-Pinchot Controversy of 1910*, Princeton, 1941. In *Breaking New Ground*, Gifford Pinchot accuses Taft of deserting Roosevelt's conservation program, sharply criticizes Ballinger's policies, and defends his own position at length. Samuel P. Hays has recently provided a new appraisal of the controversy in which he chides his fellow-historians for having been beguiled into surrendering objective analysis by the ideology of democratic protest that accompanied the conservation movement. To picture the controversy as a crusade for the "common people" against the "trusts," he contends, is a gross oversimplification. Nor, according to Hays, was the Ballinger-Pinchot Controversy the result of a lack of public morality; rather, its roots lay in the differences over administrative policies, some of which began to emerge as early as 1907. *Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency*, 147-174.

⁹⁵ Mowry shows clearly that the key to an understanding of Roosevelt's actions in 1910 lies in his desire to reunite the Republican party. For an earlier article by Mowry on this subject, see "Theodore Roosevelt and the Election of 1910," *MVHR*, XXV (March, 1939), 523-534.

sively.⁹⁶ One aspect of this interest has been the origins of Roosevelt's New Nationalism. Eric F. Goldman, George E. Mowry, and other historians have stressed the role of Herbert Croly as the theoretician if not the originator of the New Nationalism.⁹⁷ Two scholars who have been most critical of Theodore Roosevelt in recent years—Daniel Aaron and Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr.—have concentrated their fire upon Roosevelt's well-advertised progressive doctrine. In *Men of Good Hope*, Aaron characterizes Roosevelt as a leader of "comic vanity and inveterate opportunism," a late-comer to reform whose progressivism was of the "most dubious sort."⁹⁸ He emphasizes the elite strain in the New Yorker's make-up and pictures the real Roosevelt as a militarist and a disciplinarian. According to Aaron, the Croly-Roosevelt program was a kind of "pseudo-progressive makeshift," engendered more from "a fear of social revolution than a dream of fulfillment."⁹⁹ It is at this

⁹⁶ See, for example, Howard W. Smith, "The Progressive Party and the Election of 1912 in Alabama," *Alabama Review*, IX (January, 1956), 5-21; William A. Pitkin, "Issues in the Roosevelt-Taft Contest of 1912," *Mid-America*, XXXIV (October, 1952), 219-232; Elmo R. Richardson, "Conservation as a Political Issue: The Western Progressives' Dilemma, 1909-1912," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, XLIX (April, 1958), 49-54; "Mill-dred Throne," "Iowa and the Presidential Election of 1912," *Palimpsest*, XXXIII (October, 1952), 289-336; and Alpheus Thomas Mason, *Brandeis: A Free Man's Life*, New York, 1946, Chs. XXIII-XXIV. For Roosevelt's abortive effort to win electoral support in the South, see George E. Mowry, "The South and the Progressive Lily White Party of 1912," *Journal of Southern History*, VI (May, 1940), 237-247; Arthur S. Link, "Theodore Roosevelt and the South in 1912," *North Carolina Historical Review*, XXIII (July, 1946), 313-324; and Link (ed.), "Correspondence Relating to the Progressive Party's 'Lily White' Policy in 1912," *Journal of Southern History*, X (November, 1944), 480-490. A slight article that suggests some of the contrasts between Roosevelt and Wilson as progressive leaders is Jack Kenny Williams, "Roosevelt, Wilson, and the Progressive Movement," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, LIV (April, 1955), 207-211.

⁹⁷ Goldman, *Rendezvous with Destiny: A History of Modern American Reform*, New York, 1952, 188-207; Mowry, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement*, 146. In his latest book, where he demonstrates Roosevelt's drift to the left during the last two years of his presidency, Mowry suggests that Croly's influence on Roosevelt has been exaggerated by earlier historians. *The Era of Theodore Roosevelt*, 222. See also Blum, *The Republican Roosevelt*, 107, 143. For a perceptive analysis of Croly's famous book, see Byron Dexter, "Herbert Croly and the Promise of American Life," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXX (June, 1955), 197-218.

⁹⁸ "Theodore Roosevelt and Brooks Adams: Pseudo-Progressives," *Men of Good Hope: A Story of American Progressives*, New York, 1951, 245-280.

⁹⁹ Although several historians have commented on Roosevelt's almost pathological fear of left-wing radicalism and his revulsion for socialism, there is as yet no thorough analysis of his response to and impact upon the American left. Some mention of Roosevelt in this connection can be found in the following studies of socialism in the United States: Ray Ginger, *The Bending Cross: A Biography of Eugene Victor Debs*, New Brunswick, N.J., 1949; Daniel Bell, "The Background and Development of Marxian Socialism in the United States," in Donald Drew Egbert and

point in particular that Aaron seeks to show that Brooks Adams greatly influenced Roosevelt's thinking.¹⁰⁰

Arthur A. Ekirch maintains that the progressive movement, while supporting some liberal causes and opposing many domestic abuses, was not primarily a liberal movement and that it abandoned almost completely the philosophy of natural rights for a kind of political instrumentalism.¹⁰¹ As President, says Ekirch, Theodore Roosevelt emphasized to a "superlative degree" the nationalistic side of progressivism. Ekirch stresses the Hamiltonian notions of the progressives, the influence of collectivist and statist views from abroad on the evolution of American progressivism, the *rapprochement* between business and progressive tenets, and the intimate relationship between "the aggressive foreign policy of the progressives and their emphasis on nationalism in home affairs." Ekirch's interpretation is suggestive, but it errs in its emphasis and distorts the meaning of American progressivism by characterizing the movement as a whole largely in terms of the ideas of such eastern exponents of the New Nationalism as Herbert Croly, George W. Perkins, and Theodore Roosevelt. As George E. Mowry has acutely observed of Roosevelt in 1912, "He was supported in the West not because of his New Nationalism but in spite of it."¹⁰² The character of the progressive movement can be accurately determined only when enough studies of its manifestation at the state and local levels have been made to permit authoritative generalizations. Such studies as Russel B. Nye's *Midwestern Progressive Politics* (which emphasizes the midwestern character of progressivism and vividly contrasts the liberalism of Croly and Roosevelt with that of Midwesterners like La Follette),¹⁰³ Mowry's *The California Progressives* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1951), and Robert S. Maxwell, *La Follette and Rise of the Progressives in Wisconsin* (Madison, 1956)

Stow Persons (eds.), *Socialism and American Life*, 2 vols., Princeton, 1952, I, 215-405; Ira Kipnis, *The American Socialist Movement, 1897-1912*, New York, 1952; David A. Shannon, "The Socialist Party Before the First World War: An Analysis," *MVHR*, XXXVIII (September, 1951), 279-288; Shannon, *The Socialist Party of America: A History*, New York, 1955; and H. Wayne Morgan, "Eugene Debs and the Socialist Campaign of 1912," *Mid-America*, XXXIX (October, 1957), 210-226.

¹⁰⁰ Arthur F. Beringause, *Brooks Adams: A Biography*, New York, 1955, offers additional evidence of the ideological agreement between Adams and Roosevelt, and of Adams' influence on T.R.

¹⁰¹ *The Decline of American Liberalism*, New York, 1955, 171-194.

¹⁰² *Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement*, 280.

¹⁰³ *Midwestern Progressive Politics*, 181-296. Nye contends that while Roosevelt's dramatization of the conflict between progressivism and conservatism brought him the reluctant support of the midwestern progressives, he never touched "the real progressive tradition."

suggest how diversified a lot American progressives were and how untenable a monolithic interpretation of the progressive movement would be.¹⁰⁴

Three or four recent memoirs are important as sources for an understanding of Theodore Roosevelt and the progressive movement. Of these, *The Autobiography of William Allen White* (New York, 1946) is most notable. White, who was one of those who stood with Roosevelt at Armageddon, has written a graphic account of Republican insurgency and the Progressive party, and his magnificent evocation of the spirit that animated the Roosevelt Progressives helps make his book a classic in recent American history. Henry L. Stimson's *On Active Service in Peace and War* offers a revealing example of how Roosevelt attracted able young men to government service, throws light on New York politics,¹⁰⁵ and provides a case study of a Roosevelt man who stayed with the Taft administration in 1912.¹⁰⁶ Important for its illumination of the conflict within the Progressive party during the years 1912-1916 is Amos Pinchot's *History of the Progressive Party*, which has been skillfully edited by Helene M. Hooker.¹⁰⁷ Pinchot, who was almost from the first a "Cassandra to the Colonel," wrote a highly subjective and selective account, but one that is valuable for the

¹⁰⁴ For other recent accounts of progressivism in different states and regions, see the La Follettes, Robert M. La Follette, I, passim; Herbert F. Margulies, "The Background of the La Follette-McGovern Schism," *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, XL (Autumn, 1956), 21-29; Arthur S. Link, "The Progressive Movement in the South, 1870-1914," *North Carolina Historical Review*, XXIII (April, 1946), 172-195; C. Vann Woodward, *Origins of the New South, 1877-1913*, Baton Rouge, 1951, 369-395; and Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., "The Origins of Progressive Leadership," in Morison, *Letters*, VIII, 1462-1465.

¹⁰⁵ Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, New York, 1947. See also Elting E. Morison's valuable biography, *Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson*, Boston, 1960. Herbert H. Rosenthal, "The Cruise of the Tarpon," *New York History*, XXXIX (October, 1958), 303-320, is a revealing analysis of New York politics in 1910, and of Roosevelt's conference with Taft at New Haven in September, 1910.

¹⁰⁶ On the organization and later course of the Progressive party, see Donald R. Richberg, *My Hero: The Indiscreet Memoirs of an Eventful but Unheroic Life*, New York, 1954, Harold L. Ickes, *The Autobiography of a Curmudgeon*, New York, 1943, and John A. Garraty, *Right-Hand Man: The Life of George W. Perkins*, New York, 1960. William T. Hutchinson's first-rate biography, *Lowden of Illinois: The Life of Frank O. Lowden*, 2 vols., Chicago, 1957, is informative on Illinois politics during the Roosevelt era, on Lowden's work after 1912 to bring the Progressives and the Republicans back together, and on his friendship with Roosevelt.

¹⁰⁷ Helene Maxwell Hooker (ed.), *History of the Progressive Party, 1912-1916*, by Amos R. E. Pinchot, Washington Square, N.Y., 1958. The editor has provided a lengthy sketch of Amos Pinchot and an excellent analysis of his basic ideas.

light it throws on the abandonment of La Follette's candidacy by the Pinchots and others early in 1912,¹⁰⁸ the differences between the "radical nucleus" of the party and Roosevelt over the trust question and the role of George W. Perkins in the party's management, and the decline and collapse of the organization.¹⁰⁹

Roosevelt's activities following his defeat in 1912 have not yet received adequate treatment. In addition to Mowry's account of the Progressive party's decline, two recent works should be mentioned: William Henry Harbaugh's unpublished study of Wilson, Roosevelt, and intervention during the years 1914-1917,¹¹⁰ and Robert E. Osgood's *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations*, which has been cited in connection with Roosevelt's early twentieth-century ventures in *Realpolitik*. Although Harbaugh's study is most valuable for its analysis of public opinion and pressure groups on the question of intervention, it is important also for its careful examination of Roosevelt's thought and action during this period.¹¹¹ Osgood uses Roosevelt as a symbol in the conflict between ideals and self-interest in American foreign relations during the first two decades of the twentieth century. He makes a notable contribution in his brilliant exegesis of Roosevelt's motivations in his fight for American public opinion. The ex-President feared that his country's position in the world would be des-

¹⁰⁸ On this point and the early planning that led to Roosevelt's bid for the nomination, see Robert M. Warner, "Chase S. Osborn and the Presidential Campaign of 1912," *MVHR*, XLVI (June, 1959), 19-45.

¹⁰⁹ Pinchot's *bête noire* was George W. Perkins, whom he believed to be part of a conspiracy by big business to mislead Roosevelt and undermine the Progressive party. Another critical view of Perkins is evident in Harold L. Ickes, "Who Killed the Progressive Party?" *AHR*, XLVI (January, 1941), 306-337. For the views of a disillusioned Progressive who supported Woodrow Wilson in 1916, see Fred L. Israel, "Bainbridge Colby and the Progressive Party, 1914-1916," *New York History*, XL (January, 1959), 33-46. Excerpts from the telephone conversations between Perkins and Roosevelt during the 1916 Progressive party convention have been edited by John A. Garraty as "T.R. on the Telephone," *American Heritage*, IX (December, 1957), 99-108.

¹¹⁰ "Wilson, Roosevelt, and Intervention, 1914-1917: A Study of Domestic Influences on the Formulation of American Foreign Policy," Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1954. See also the brilliant chapter on the preparedness controversy in Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era*, and Russell Buchanan, "Theodore Roosevelt and American Neutrality, 1914-1917," *AHR*, XLIII (July, 1938), 775-790. Hermann Hagedorn, *The Bugle that Woke America: The Saga of Theodore Roosevelt's Last Battle for His Country*, New York, 1940, is a highly partisan account of the ex-President's efforts to further the cause of American preparedness before and after the United States entered the war.

¹¹¹ An excellent reassessment of the domestic and diplomatic factors in the United States, Great Britain, and Germany that led to American intervention in 1917, is Ernest R. May, *The World War and American Isolation, 1914-1917*, Cambridge, 1959.

troyed if Germany won the war, but Osgood doubts that considerations of national security had a direct influence upon his desire for intervention. It was the inhumanity and humiliation inflicted by the submarine campaign and not its threat to the Western Hemisphere that aroused his passionate feelings. Wilson's apparent success in winning popular backing for his milk-and-water ideals, for which Roosevelt had the utmost contempt and which he sincerely believed would lead the country down the road to disaster, exacerbated his fears. Osgood uses Nietzsche's distinction between the Warrior and the Priest to depict the positions of the two leaders, whose differences, he thinks, were more than personal and partisan, involving also a struggle between contrasting philosophies of international relations.¹¹² In some respects Roosevelt was a realist in his attitude toward foreign affairs; but Osgood's volume demonstrates that in others he was "a militant idealist and something of an aggressive national egoist as well."

No evaluation of recent Rooseveltian historiography would be complete without special reference to the eight-volume edition of Roosevelt's letters published during the early 1950's.¹¹³ A distinguished contribution to Roosevelt literature in its own right, this superbly-edited work has proven an extraordinary stimulus to historians and biographers interested in the Roosevelt era.¹¹⁴ Everyone will not agree with the editors' selection of letters and the specialist will still find it necessary to use the Roosevelt manuscripts. Nevertheless, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt* is a magnificently documented record of Roosevelt's life and career.¹¹⁵

¹¹² Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest*, 88-91, 96, 102-103, 112, 135-153, 202-203, 245, 249, 271-273.

¹¹³ Morison, *Letters*. For a few other published letters of Roosevelt, see Morison (ed.), *Cowboys and Kings: Three Great Letters by Theodore Roosevelt*, Cambridge, 1954, and John Joseph Gallagher (ed.), "The Theodore Roosevelt Letters to Cardinal Gibbons," *Catholic Historical Review*, XLIV (January, 1959), 440-456.

¹¹⁴ On the Roosevelt Papers and the procedures used in editing the letters, see, in addition to Morison's introductions in Vols. I, III, and V of *The Letters*, Thomas Little, "The Theodore Roosevelt Collection at Harvard," *Harvard Library Bulletin*, V (Autumn, 1951), 376-378; Elting E. Morison, "The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt," *ibid.*, 378-381; John M. Blum, "Editors' Camera: 'The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt,'" *American Documentation*, I (Fall, 1950), 181-184; and Morison, "Some Thoughts on the Roosevelt Papers," *Library of Congress Quarterly Journal of Current Acquisitions*, XV (May, 1958), 101-105.

¹¹⁵ For some discerning evaluations of *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, see Howard K. Beale's reviews in the *AHR*, LVII (October, 1951), 184-187; (July, 1952), 998-1002; LIX (October, 1953), 159-163; LX (July, 1955), 918-921; and two review essays by Richard L. Watson, Jr., "Theodore Roosevelt: The Years of Preparation, 1868-1900," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, LI (April, 1952), 301-315, and "Theodore Roosevelt and Herbert Hoover," *ibid.*, LIII (January, 1954), 109-129.

A review of the impressive body of historical literature devoted to Roosevelt and his times prompts a few general observations. For one thing, despite the extensive work accomplished during the last fifteen years, there are striking gaps in the biographical and historical coverage of the Roosevelt era. In the case of Roosevelt himself, there is still no full-scale biography based on a familiarity with all of the Roosevelt manuscripts and other relevant sources. Nor have all phases and aspects of the Rough Rider's career received adequate treatment in monographic studies and articles. As for the Roosevelt period, one might suggest the need for biographies of such men as George B. Cortelyou, Philander C. Knox, and Nicholas Murray Butler, not to mention numerous congressional figures and state and local leaders.¹¹⁶ There is as yet no good treatment of important features of Roosevelt's presidency, including his conservative program, the Panic of 1907, the Country Life Commission, and his antitrust program.¹¹⁷ There are exciting possibilities for studies of reform on the local, state, and regional levels; for an investigation of American conservatism during this period; for the impact of technological advances and the organizational revolution upon American social and political life; and for new approaches to American foreign policy.

One of the notable characteristics of Rooseveltian historiography since World War II is the change in attitude of historians toward Roosevelt. In a recent reference to new works on Roosevelt, Hermann Hagedorn observed that in none of them was there "a trace of the patronizing, even sneering skepticism of the appraisals that had been accepted by too many of the historical writers of the past thirty years as the proper attitude to take toward Mr. Roosevelt. . . ."¹¹⁸ In many respects this is a desirable development. The older views of Roosevelt associated with Pringle's interpretation and the 1930's surely went too far in picturing the Rough Rider as a political opportunist, a man lacking in principle, and a pseudo-progressive who failed to comprehend the nature of the fundamental problems of his day, evaded issues, and in many ways actually

¹¹⁶ For two suggestive articles on research needs and possibilities for this period, see John M. Blum, "A Note on Method and Materials," in Morison, *Letters*, VIII, 1495-1505, and Richard L. Watson, Jr., "American Political History, 1900-1920," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, LIV (January, 1955), 107-126.

¹¹⁷ Professor Arthur M. Johnson of Harvard University is now engaged in writing a book on federal antitrust policy during the period 1903-1914.

¹¹⁸ "Report of the Theodore Roosevelt Centennial Commission to the Congress of the United States," New York, 1959.

hindered genuine reform.¹¹⁹ Yet it is a cause for wonder and perhaps concern that, with some important exceptions, most Roosevelt writers since 1945 have not paid proper tribute to the critical side of Clío's craft. Many of these authors have been amateurs, but the lack of critical judgment has also characterized the work on Roosevelt by some professional historians. One need not oppose a proper recognition of Roosevelt's constructive work and prophetic insights to feel that historians and biographers have swung too far away from the skeptical approach of the prewar scholars.

Roosevelt continues to be a controversial figure. His interpreters have not agreed, for example, whether to call him a conservative or a liberal. Although most recent writers have been inclined to accept John M. Blum's characterization of him as an enlightened conservative,¹²⁰ two of the leading Roosevelt students—Howard K. Beale and George E. Mowry—have entered dissents and argue that Roosevelt falls within the American liberal tradition. It may well be, as Samuel P. Hays has suggested, that Roosevelt's biographers and historians of the progressive period have been overly concerned with the traditional theme of liberal-conservative conflict. Hays believes that Roosevelt is difficult to characterize because historians have asked the wrong question about him. They have insisted on interpreting the significance of his career as primarily in its role in the social conflict of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries between the business community and the farmer-labor groups. Actually, Hays declares, Roosevelt sought to avoid social struggle, refused to become identified with either side, and is chiefly significant for the attempt he made to supplant this conflict with a "scientific" approach to social and economic questions.¹²¹ Whether or not Theodore Roosevelt was a progres-

¹¹⁹ Louis Filler probably expressed a typical attitude among American historians when he wrote in 1939, "Each year Roosevelt becomes less impressive in retrospect, and it is unlikely that he will ever resume the stature he enjoyed in his days of triumph." *Crusaders for American Liberalism*, new ed., Yellow Springs, Ohio, 1950, 44.

¹²⁰ In his thoughtful introduction to Vol. V of *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, Morison suggests that the distinguishing characteristics of the Roosevelt administration, which he says were the intuitive approach to situations, the selection of the individual as the primary object of concern in society, and the unruffled attitude toward power, were part of the conservative temper of the period (p. xxii).

¹²¹ Hays thinks that Roosevelt, who viewed the good society as agrarian and pre-industrial, accepted the technical requirements of an increasingly organized industrial society but feared its social consequences. Hays suggests that these contradictory elements in Roosevelt's outlook fused in an almost mystical approach to the political order best described as "social atomism." *Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency*, 266-271.

sive, it is difficult to disagree with Henry F. May's conclusion that he was "the greatest spokesman of practical idealism in America" and "a compelling symbol of the country's regeneration."¹²²

There is much to be said for the historical writing on Theodore Roosevelt during the years 1945-1960. Far better than was true before 1945, recent scholars, most notably John M. Blum, have illuminated the roots of Roosevelt's career and the sources of his convictions. There is now, after George E. Mowry's excellent work, a new understanding of the impetus the twenty-sixth President gave to progressive politics in the United States, and of his own evolving progressivism. His skill in the game of politics, his contribution to the revivification of the presidency, his awareness of the implications of America's new industrial society and his efforts to work out policies for adjusting to it, his understanding of the fact that the United States was, inexorably, a part of the world and her foreign policy must be shaped with that in mind—all of these things about Roosevelt have become much clearer during the last decade and a half. Meanwhile, scores of historians not directly concerned with Roosevelt have helped to fill in the historical interstices of his period. And, finally, recent Rooseveltian historiography has suggested, even if it has not adequately explained, those defects in Roosevelt's character and those limitations in his policies which prevented him from being an even greater American.

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¹²² *The End of American Innocence: A Study of the First Years of Our Own Time, 1912-1917*, New York, 1959, 17, 107.

John Boyle O'Reilly, Social Reform Editor

In the post-Civil War era John Boyle O'Reilly, editor of Boston's Catholic and Irish weekly, the *Pilot*, cast a critical eye over the American social scene.¹ Having witnessed the advent of "big business" with its rich and powerful leaders, he sadly reflected on the retreat of the masses into their foul, overcrowded tenements, which became breeding places for crime and social discontent. And so, by 1870, O'Reilly had inaugurated his own campaign against all forms of encroachment, especially that of the state upon a subjected people and the industrial lords upon the masses.

The Boston editor's sympathy for the workers, the poor and the destitute had been nourished since the days of his youth, for he had been born on the eve of Ireland's great starvation time and, as a young boy in County Meath, had been associated with the misery accompanying the famine of the 1840's. When he arrived on the American scene, therefore, he was already conditioned to reform, and the unrest then prevalent in American society gave added impetus to his crusading spirit.

In the decades before prominent writers like Edward Bellamy (*Looking Backward*), Jacob Riis (*How the Other Half Lives*), Henry Lloyd (*Wealth Against Commonwealth*), and at a time when Henry George was working on his famous *Progress and Poverty*, O'Reilly had already given notice of his keen interest in a reformation of the social order. His chief inspiration was the cry of the toiling masses crowded into the slums of the cities and subjected to numberless indignities. The expensive living of the opulent lords and masters constituted in his eyes a crime against society that demanded redress. His poem, "The City Streets," was

¹ John Boyle O'Reilly was born on June 28, 1844, in County Meath, Ireland. While an Irish rebel in the British army, he was unmasked, court-martialed and imprisoned in 1866. The young Fenian escaped from the penal colony of Western Australia in 1869, and after an odyssey of nine months he landed in Philadelphia and soon removed to Boston. In July, 1870, he assumed the position of editor of the *Pilot*, and together with the Catholic Archbishop, John J. Williams, became co-proprietor of the journal in April, 1876. He died on August 10, 1890. For a detailed account of O'Reilly's career cf. Francis G. McManamin, S.J., "The American Years of John Boyle O'Reilly, 1870-1890," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, The Catholic University of America, 1959; James J. Roche, *Life of John Boyle O'Reilly*, New York, 1891; William G. Schofield, *Seek for a Hero: The Story of John Boyle O'Reilly*, New York, 1956.

a scathing indictment of the heartless city with its palaces of merchant kings where the "well-bred" reigned, ignoring the cries of the anguished poor in their forbidden districts—"over ten thousand huddled here, where a hundred live of our upper ten."² O'Reilly cried for justice and an adherence to divine law in this and other poems like, "From the Earth—a Cry," and "Prometheus Christ." At times his impassioned verses almost seemed aimed at a total disruption of contemporary society. Nevertheless, in spite of his forebodings and unveiled threats he did not countenance violence on the part of the oppressed, for he maintained that social advancement necessitated an adherence to the law of God and that only on this foundation could there be any constructive changes in society. For the pharisaical laws of man, however, he had nothing but contempt.

O'Reilly's poetic flayings of contemporary society lacked any clearly defined program of social reconstruction. His editorials, on the other hand, while stigmatizing the social order in the same vein as his poetry, offered more concrete solutions, for most of his writings for the *Pilot* on social themes dealt with specific conflicts in labor-management relations and flagrant violations of justice and charity toward the workingman and the poor, as well as the consequences resulting from labor's bid for recognition. His solutions to these problems reflect his perception of the root causes of these social disorders.

In the absence of an official stand by the leaders of the Catholic Church in the United States on the abuses current in the industrial system, O'Reilly formulated his own reform program from the age-old teachings of the Church and their adaptations to modern life. He was likewise acquainted with the writings and programs of some of the more progressive European Catholic reformers so that many of the ideas he espoused later received papal sanction in the two famous labor encyclicals, *Rerum novarum* (1891) and *Quadragesimo anno* (1931).

The rapid rise of an industrial society in the land of O'Reilly's adoption had caught most of the leaders of the Catholic Church in the United States unawares,³ and without a comprehensive social

² O'Reilly's poems have been published in many places, and they have been gathered together by Roche; for "The City Streets," cf. Roche, *Life of John Boyle O'Reilly*, 513-517.

³ The Church in these decades was greatly preoccupied with such problems as secret societies, parochial schools, ecclesiastical discipline, and seminary education. Cf. *Concilii Plenarii Baltimorensis II, Decreta*, Baltimore, 1868, and *Decreta Concilii Plenarii Baltimorensis Tertii*, Baltimore, 1886.

philosophy they vacillated on some paramount questions. As a consequence, some of these problems encountered by both clergy and laity received conflicting solutions.⁴ But the precedents had already been established in Europe that proved to be an invaluable guide for the development of a Catholic social philosophy peculiar to Americian industrial growth.⁵

From the ideas advanced by certain reform writers both at home and abroad—complemented by his personal observations of the social scene—O'Reilly was able to give expression to his own social philosophy. Nor were other American Catholic publicists totally unobservant in this respect, for in the 1870's the *American Catholic Quarterly Review* discussed such topics as the ownership of property, secret societies, the labor question, and socialism in the United States, while the *Catholic World* gave prominence to labor, the Communist International, and kindred topics; and Catholic and Irish newspapers were notable defenders of the workingman and the poor. Still, the American Church did not take up the gauntlet in earnest until the 1880's, when it was brought face to face with the critical situation created by the growing labor movement in which so many of its members were enrolled.⁶

Whereas the American hierarchy had been somewhat tardy with regard to the labor question during the post-Civil War era,

⁴ Henry J. Browne, *The Catholic Church and the Knights of Labor*, Washington, 1949, Chapter I. Archbishop William Henry Elder, of Cincinnati, reflected this confusion in a letter to James Cardinal Gibbons, of Baltimore, saying, "I said however, I believed it would be a great service, if some authoritative declaration should be given, of the doctrines of the Church on some of these questions [Henry George and other matters]. There are some Catholics who do not know what to believe and profess. There are others, who hold sound doctrines, and yet hesitate to pronounce decidedly against false ones: because these have not been distinctly condemned by authority." March 23, 1888, Cincinnati. Archives of the Archdiocese of Baltimore.

⁵ An important European Catholic social reformer was Wilhelm Emmanuel von Ketteler, Bishop of Mainz. Cf., George Metlake, *Christian Social Reform*, Philadelphia, 1912, and William Edward Hogan, S.V.D., *The Development of Bishop Wilhelm Emmanuel von Ketteler's Interpretation of the Social Problem*, Washington, 1946. For a study of Henry Cardinal Manning and the social reform movement in England cf. Edmund S. Purcell, *Life of Cardinal Manning, Archbishop of Westminster*, New York, 1895-1896, II, chap. XXII, and Shane Leslie, *Cardinal Manning. His Life and Labours*, New York, 1954.

⁶ Aaron I. Abell, "The Catholic Factor in Urban Welfare: The Early Period, 1850-1880," *Review of Politics*, XIV (July, 1952), 319-321, and Abell, "American Catholic Reaction to the Industrial Conflict: Arbitral Process: 1885-1900," *Catholic Historical Review* XLI (January, 1956), 385-407. Also cf. James E. Roohan, "American Catholics and the Social Question, 1865-1890," *Historical Records and Studies* XLIII (1955), 3-26; John Tracy Ellis, *The Life of James Cardinal Gibbons*, Milwaukee, 1952, I; Browne, *Catholic Church and Knights of Labor*, Ch. I.

the labor movement itself had struck out on a bold course of expansion. The "Noble Order of the Knights of Labor," founded in 1869, provided a common meeting ground for many of the oppressed groups of contemporary society. Because of the policy of secrecy, however, the K. of L. erected a barrier between itself and the Catholic Church. As the years advanced Churchmen felt constrained to seek the removal of this stigma of secrecy from the Knights. Measures had to be undertaken to insure the protection and advancement of the laboring classes in civil society within the safeguards of religion.⁷ Ultimately when the Catholic, Terence V. Powderly, became leader of the Knights in 1879, he was prevailed upon to remove this seal of secrecy which deprived them of the Church's approbation.⁸

O'Reilly, meanwhile, had been a critic of all secret societies, an attitude that dated back to the period when he had dissociated himself from the Fenians. He had seen the abuses to which these secret groups had given rise and had been at pains to publicize them. His solution was a firm obedience to the directives of the Catholic Church, since, in his judgment, she was the only physician capable of countering the plague of such organizations.⁹ He realized that secret labor societies alienated employer and employees and pitted social classes against one another. However much his poetical anathemas seemed to nourish the idea of a class warfare that would terminate in universal equality, he had never advocated an abolition of classes.¹⁰ Keenly aware as he was that the in-

⁷ Richard Gilmour, Bishop of Cleveland, expressed his fear of the possibility of labor's dissatisfaction with the Church's policy in this delicate matter. Referring to George's book, he told Archbishop Elder that it would be a mistake to condemn it and, as he added, "create bitter hostility towards the Church by the workingmen & the poor who are getting edged enough as it is and will soon be looking for a victim to assail..." Cleveland, April 17, 1888. Archives of the Archdiocese of Cincinnati. For the secular aspects of this period cf. Foster Rhea Dulles, *Labor in America*, New York, 1955; John R. Commons et al., *History of Labour in the United States*, (New York, 1918), II. Arthur Mann, *Yankee Reformers in the Urban Age*, Cambridge, 1954, is a good study of New England in the latter decades of the nineteenth century and an analysis of the reform programs. His chapter, "Irish Catholic Liberalism," however, must be read with caution, for some of his statements of Catholic doctrine and the social philosophy of John Boyle O'Reilly need clarification.

⁸ Browne, *Catholic Church and Knights of Labor*, and Ellis, *Life of James Cardinal Gibbons*, I.

⁹ *Pilot*, May 18, 1872.

¹⁰ O'Reilly viewed European society as a constant conflict between two antagonistic classes, the rich and the poor. American society, on the other hand, was epitomized as one of class distinctions with free interchange among the groups. Louis Hartz's distinction between European Liberalism and American Liberalism suggests a definition O'Reilly would have been pleased to make. *Liberal Tradition in America*, New York, 1955.

justices and opprobrium heaped upon the masses were not inherent in society nor in the capitalistic system, he made it clear that these abuses stemmed from the uncontrolled propensity toward individual aggrandizement to which weak human nature was an easy prey. His cry, therefore, was to abolish the injustices and the abuses and in so doing the aristocratic social class in the European sense would be abolished, without detriment to the acceptable class distinctions that existed in American society. "We look at rich and poor," he said, "employer and workman as a necessity, and as true order to go on forever in this world."¹¹ To O'Reilly it was not a crime to grow rich by honest means; but he insisted that wealth did not bring with it an arbitrary right to its disposal.¹²

Early in his crusade for social betterment O'Reilly was confronted by labor's renewal of its bid for an eight-hour working day, but he did not concede it his immediate endorsement. Although the Boston Eight Hour League, the successor of the Massachusetts Grand Eight Hour League, had been established as late as 1869,¹³ it was the intensified agitation in New York that first brought the subject to the attention of the Boston journalist in 1872. In countering labor's demand on this point, O'Reilly relied on stock arguments, remarking that the workmen must first be educated in the proper use of leisure time. He also added that the agitation for an eight-hour day would be unfair to those workmen who were willing and anxious to work longer hours. "Tyranny this seems to be certainly," he declared, for "if a man is not at liberty to work as long and as hard as he pleases, he is a bondman, and the end of a struggle conducted on such grounds may be safely predicted."¹⁴ Moreover, O'Reilly insisted on the prime requisite of the workingman's freedom when deciding his hours and wages, and to his mind trade unions had no authority to interfere. So when he declared that a successful agitation of the eight-hour movement would tend to reduce all men to the same improvident level, it was scarcely very helpful to the class O'Reilly sought most to assist. "It is the workingman's right to sell his labor as high or as low as he pleases," he said, "since laborers must not apply to each other the compulsion they would deem tyranny if applied to themselves by an employer."¹⁵

¹¹ *Pilot*, June 1, 1872.

¹² *Ibid.*, August 17, 1878; February 19, 1887. Similar ideas were expressed by Pope Leo XIII, *Rerum novarum*, par. 26, and by Pope Pius XI, *Quadragesimo anno*, par. 136. References to the encyclicals are to the edition of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1942.

¹³ Commons, *History of Labor*, II, 140.

¹⁴ *Pilot*, April 12, 1873; June 8, 1872; June 22, 1872.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, June 20, 1874; April 14, 1873.

As conservative as this doctrine may sound, it was a commonly accepted policy in 1874. Richard Gilmour, Bishop of Cleveland, was of a similar mind with O'Reilly and in his lenten pastoral of 1879 remarked that united with a man's right to join a union was his right to sell his labor. Where labor unions sin, he added, was in their attempt to coerce men to affiliate with the unions, or when they tried to force laborers to work for the price fixed by them. A union, he admitted, had the right to adjust wage scales at which its members would work, but no union had the right to force a man to sell his labor for the price determined by it.¹⁶

O'Reilly, meanwhile, had emphasized the fundamental principle of a subsistence wage. Acknowledging the rights of both employer and employee, he admonished the latter not to demand exorbitant wages. Yet if an employer cared not whether the remunerations supported an employee and his family, then he was acting unlawfully and in an inhuman manner.¹⁷ But in justice to the employer, O'Reilly insisted that due consideration must be given to the value of money and brains, the employer's chief investment, along with a fair determination of the market price of the product, before any wage demand should be proposed. The profit that remained, he concluded, was to be divided between the employer and his employees. A settlement founded on these principles would be fair, he remarked, but all restrictive agreements or combinations of either capital or labor would be, in his mind, unjust.¹⁸

Industrial society being constituted as it was, O'Reilly's proposals were viewed as entirely too idealistic. Thus, as a counter measure to insure the success of his policy, O'Reilly advocated the establishment of boards of arbitration, either public or private, to determine where the employer's profits should terminate and the workingman's wages commence, and to make a fair adjustment of the profits between the two.¹⁹ In emphasizing the need for arbitration O'Reilly did not distinguish clearly the principles embodied in the modern terms of collective bargaining, arbitration, mediation and investigation. When he used the specialized term, arbitration,

¹⁶ "Lenten Pastoral," March 12, 1879. Archives of the Diocese of Cleveland. James O'Connor (Vicar Apostolic of Nebraska), writing in the *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, (July, 1883), stated that everyone has a right to hire his labor on any terms satisfactory to himself and no one can deprive him of it. Pope Leo XIII expressed similar views, but insisted that underlying such agreements there must be an element of natural justice; *Rerum novarum*, par. 63.

¹⁷ *Pilot*, August 4, 1877; *Rerum novarum*, par. 63; *Quadragesimo* par. 71.

¹⁸ *Pilot*, August 18, 1877; *Rerum novarum*, par. 28.

¹⁹ *Pilot*, January 16, 1875; June 19, 1875; November 2, 1878.

therefore, he frequently embraced the notions connoted by the other terms also. O'Reilly, of course, was not an exception, for the terms themselves were not clearly defined nor much used in his era.

In the capital-labor disputes over wages O'Reilly declared that labor had a title to a fair profit ensuing from the application of labor to raw materials, not to the mere pittance then awarded the workingman to keep him in bread and shelter.²⁰

Whereas the Boston editor's principal emphasis for a remedy to the labor-management problem was arbitration, labor itself preferred a form of unilateral action, the strike. This form of retaliation was emphatically denounced by O'Reilly, and he advised workmen that if they reflected on their own position they would realize that protecting their interests in such a foolish manner would be suicidal.²¹ But O'Reilly's opposition was of little account, since strikes played an increasingly prominent role in the industrial strife of the 1870's and 1880's. In fact, during the latter decade they became a deadly instrument, enhancing the power of the labor movement but also proving to be the rock on which the Knights of Labor were destined to founder.

The leader of the Knights, Terence Powderly, was as opposed to strikes as O'Reilly professed to be, yet during this era of upheaval both men were compelled to retreat from their idealistic positions and to countenance the strike as a method of retaliation at the same time that they expressed hostility to it. Having pleaded with the workmen to refrain from membership in trade unions which generated strikes, O'Reilly added that strikes could effectuate no permanent settlement since they relied on brute force, while peace could be restored by Christian principles and common sense.²² This negative approach did not, however, entirely preoccupy the editor of the *Pilot*, for he also propounded a positive doctrine on the question of industrial strife. "Instead of a strike," he once remarked, "let the dissatisfied workmen start a shop or a store of their own, and meet the masters on their own ground by becoming masters themselves."²³ By co-operative shops the united labor force could, he thought, build up valuable stocks, the profits from which could be divided among the men, and thus by co-operative

²⁰ *Ibid.*, January 1, 1872.

²¹ *Ibid.*, March 15, 1873; June 1, 1872; June 22, 1872; May 10, 1873; November 21, 1874.

²² *Ibid.*, November 21, 1874; April 11, 1874; May 10, 1873; December 19, 1874; May 29, 1875.

²³ *Ibid.*, May 10, 1873; April 11, 1874.

stores, clothing, provisions, and the like could be purchased and all profits divided among the shareholders.²⁴

O'Reilly's ideas on co-operatives were neither new nor radical, since for a decade or more they had found place in American society. However, the stimulus that he gave to the co-operative program was so much in accord with the later action of the Knights of Labor that it deserves consideration. Lawrence, Massachusetts, and Foster's Crossing, Ohio, were only two of the sites demonstrating comparatively successful co-operatives in the years following the Civil War; similar attempts were made by practically all the trades in the following decades.²⁵ With Powderly's endorsement the Knights established many co-operatives in the early 1880's, but they generally failed, for they were unable to compete with private enterprise, nor could they secure the capital funds necessary for the expansion of their programs or the efficient management to run them.²⁶ Sensing, as he probably did, these disadvantages, in addition to the more universal obstacles such as the limitless opportunities which bred a spirit of individualism in America, the mixed populations with their varying backgrounds, customs and languages impairing unity,²⁷ O'Reilly did not press his program in the 1880's, but contented himself with remedies for purifying the social order rather than changing it.

While giving publicity to the co-operative movement, however, O'Reilly retained his enthusiasm for the principle of arbitration as he understood it. As early as January 1875, he had maintained that a straightforward interview between the representatives of the employer and the employees over a disputed wage would be beneficial to both parties. But the employer must first be questioned by the workers' representatives as to whether he could increase wages; if his answer was affirmative, then he was morally obliged to do so. If, on the other hand, he desired to reduce wages, he should be asked whether the move was necessary. Again, said O'Reilly, should the answer be affirmative, the workers had no alternative but to accept the decision.²⁸ To the Boston editor these proposals were more than expressions of Christian charity and justice; they were the measures designed to counteract the flagrant

²⁴ *Ibid.*, September 14, 1878.

²⁵ Commons, *History of Labor*, II, 110 ff, and Dulles, *Labor in America* 108 ff.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 136-137, 109.

²⁷ James P. Warbasse, *Cooperative Democracy*, New York, 1936, 56-58.

²⁸ *Pilot*, June 19, 1875; January 2, 1875. Cf. *Quadragesimo anno*, pars. 71-75.

disregard of labor's rights induced by haughty capitalists' refusal to concede the right of bargaining to the workers and their arbitrary establishment of the working conditions in industry. But O'Reilly inserted the provision that adamant refusals on the part of the employers to arbitrate demonstrated bad will and justified a strike, although it was a decision that he approached only after long consideration. He liked to envision labor, several hundred thousand men of all trades, united in one national organization, exerting their influence on public opinion and demanding arbitration even when management hesitated.²⁹ He ignored the fact that labor could have been the culprit in refusing this solution.

Since voluntary arbitration was subjected to the whims of human nature, O'Reilly would apply the remedy of compulsory arbitration, whereby the disputants would either submit to this process or take their case to a court of equity, where a binding decision would be rendered. He approved Carl Schurz's program of February, 1884, publicized in the *North American Review*, which advanced the notion of a state-appointed board of arbitration, and he added to the Schurz remarks that any system of arbitration that would tend "to bring about a fair settlement of respective claims of labor and capital to the combined fruits of both" would be a blessing to both. On another occasion he suggested that the boards should be selected by the parties involved in the altercation, each choosing a representative and together agreeing on a third member. Under these circumstances the decision of the tribunal would, he felt, be as impartial as any court might be expected to be. In a final note, however, he declared that he was opposed to permanent, salaried officials as arbitrators, especially if they were politicians.³⁰ These ideas of the Boston editor were not radical but striking and so his observations on labor marked him as a progressive among social commentators, especially among his Catholic contemporaries.

American Catholic writers in general had paid little heed to the arbitral process until the mid-1880's,³¹ even though the labor movement in the United States was vitally interested in such remedies. At the convention of the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions of the United States and Canada held in Pittsburgh in November, 1881, W. H. Foster had spoken in favor of a national law to legalize arbitration, that is, a requirement to sub-

²⁹ *Pilot*, September 25, 1875; October 2, 1875; June 28, 1879.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, October 2, 1875; August 4, 1877; November 2, 1878; February 2, 1884; May 1, 1886.

³¹ Abell, "Catholic Factor in Urban Welfare," *loc. cit.*, 385 ff.

mit a question to arbitration or to meet on the same level before an impartial tribunal. It was not meant to be a compulsory law but, as Foster said,

merely compulsory dealing with the union, or compulsory investigation by an impartial body, both parties to remain free to accept the reward, provided, however, 'that once they do agree the agreement shall remain in force for a fixed period.'³²

O'Reilly, of course, went beyond this provision when he proposed that the decisions of a court of equity should be binding on the disputants. The Pittsburgh declaration, however, was a notable shifting of labor's aspirations from the co-operative notion of the 1860's to collective bargaining and arbitration, a shift that has been characterized as denoting "a fundamental change in the aim of the labor movement—from idealistic striving for self employment to opportunistic trade unionism."³³

Meanwhile O'Reilly's idealism, undermined by the vicissitudes of the industrial order which forced him to retreat from a position of hostility to forbearance of strikes, shifted with the same winds that carried the American labor movement into the hurricane of strikes which beset the 1880's. With Powderly, the Boston editor still protested his fear of and opposition to strikes, even when he came to accept them as a necessary means of the workers' protection and an instrument for good when properly managed. In the face of the current unrest he concluded that the labor question would be settled only when all who worked for wages understood that a variety of trades did not make a variety of interests, and when they remembered that the wage-earning body was one class and one family. Should one segment of labor be oppressed, the other of necessity was obliged to cry out until the trouble was rectified by arbitration.³⁴ But it was just this failure to combine and to cement the relations of the variety of trades, embracing both skilled and unskilled workers, that spelled doom for the national labor union envisaged by O'Reilly, and paved the way for the American Federation of Labor.

Not content to propose remedial measures solely for the labor-management crisis, the editor of the *Pilot* also concentrated on one

³² Commons, *History of Labor*, II, 325-326.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Pilot*, September 7, 1889; June 28, 1879; February 28, 1880. Powderly asked Gibbons to use his influence to abolish or reduce to a minimum the strikes that were paralyzing labor and industry, and he expressed his desire to further the process of arbitration. Baltimore, July 9, 1887. Archives of the Archdiocese of Baltimore.

of the major root causes—the glutted labor market. One of his proposed remedies, which was strongly influenced by his concern for the Irish immigrant and the attention of ecclesiastical authorities to the overcrowded conditions of the cities, was his advocacy of westward migration to relieve the pressure on the labor market in the industrial centers. Years before Frederick Jackson Turner had incorporated the safety valve theory into his study of the American frontier, O'Reilly had, as early as 1878, made this part of his platform, without, of course, using the same terminology. The Boston editor realized that too many were dependent on trade and manufacturing, and he insisted that immediate return to the soil was imperative. "The earth is the true mother of national wealth and popular comfort," he once remarked; and on another occasion he declared "all wealth lies in the *crust of the earth*." He concluded that wages were low because of the surplus of labor, and prices were high because of underproduction. Building homes in the west, therefore, would alleviate both problems, and would also gain a certain measure of independence for the workingman.³⁵ O'Reilly's solution was too simple, for there were innumerable other factors which he failed to consider. Still, his proposal merited attention, and within a year the Irish Catholic Colonization Society was established to encourage and support the kind of colonization on the frontier that he and others had advocated.

In all this O'Reilly did not overlook the all-important channel for social advancement—legislation. Sagacious lawmakers, he insisted, could initiate legislation to stifle the growth of social evils and to insure the protection of satisfactory wage scales for the laborer, by determining the market point at which profits should cease and wages begin. But in pursuit of this goal O'Reilly would not endorse labor's incursion into politics by means of a labor party, for such, he held, would be a 'nuisance and an injury,' but effective measures could be accomplished by an enlightened public opinion influencing legislation.³⁶ It was the same attitude that was

³⁵ *Pilot*, April 27, 1878; August 31, 1878; September 14, 1878. Pope Leo XIII expressed similar views in *Rerum novarum*, par. 66.

³⁶ *Pilot*, January 16, 1875; August 11, 1875; July 16, 1878. In December, 1886, O'Reilly favored labor's supporting Hugh O'Brien for Mayor of Boston on the Democratic ticket. Cf. Dulles, *Labor in America*, p. 147; *Pilot*, August 10, 1878. O'Reilly also suggested a measure to curb chronic unemployment that savored of "pump-priming." He felt that since nearly every city in New England had projects that needed attention, they should hire some of the excess labor. "Labor is cheap and men are plentiful," he said, and "if they are not employed at profitable labor they will have to be supported as paupers." *Pilot*, September 4, 1875; December 18, 1875.

taken by Powderly, and later by Samuel Gompers, both of whom refused to support a labor party, conceiving instead that labor's gains could best be accomplished through the existing parties.

During this era many forms of agitation had taken root, and were nourished by chronic unemployment and industrial strife. Some of these, to be sure, were legitimate enough; others, more radical in tone, like Communism and Socialism, cloaked their tenets in verbiage that frequently deceived the casual reformer or parties interested in social betterment. These two "isms," occupying the center of the stage, had long before been condemned by the Catholic Church, and O'Reilly, too, had inveighed against them. He could not subscribe to the irreligious aspects of Communism and Socialism, nor to their belief in the abolition of private property and their levelling of the various classes of society.

With regard to the class struggle, O'Reilly was quick to admit the existence of the fundamental distinctions in society; distinctions he preferred to term them rather than classes, since, to his mind, the latter implied the European class system, which he emphatically denounced. O'Reilly acknowledged that there had to be the "hewers of wood and drawers of water," as well as leaders and governors, since God had so constituted society and it could not be otherwise. Any other theory, he maintained, was calculated to disturb the existing social order and to introduce discord and confusion where God had intended harmony and peace. He castigated as well any social theory that propagated a system which would ignore the old Christian traditions and aim at establishing a utopian condition of social equality where, as he said, "all shall be proprietors and the degradation of the laborer receiving wages would be abolished."³⁷ In defense of his position on socialism he wrote a scathing rebuke of the continental radical Johann Joseph Most, calling him a wretch and an apostle of greed and robbery. "It never struck this man," he said, "that bankers and capitalists have at least as much right to exist as workmen." The radical Most had no idea that the thing needed to improve the social system was not brute force, but a sense of "Christian brotherhood, equity, fair play." O'Reilly concluded: "The word 'socialism' which ought to stand for the noblest philosophy, is a hissing and an abomination in the ears of men, because of such moral and intellectual monsters as Herr Most."³⁸

³⁷ *Ibid.*, November 18, 1871.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, January 20, 1883.

That socialism could mean something noble was not an uncommon notion, for under different conditions of time and place, and of social and religious influences, O'Reilly and others freely interchanged the term in expressing several confused ideas.³⁹ Socialism, favorably understood, meant social legislation by which the state would intervene to protect the workers from the encroachments of relentless and ambitious capitalists. Such intervention in behalf of the common good was strictly in accord with Catholic teaching and had received the endorsement of theologians. It was, in fact, an idea to which Leo XIII gave special emphasis in his famous labor encyclical.⁴⁰ O'Reilly had anticipated the papal confirmation on this point when he declared in 1883:

Socialism is the great problem of the present and future: how to raise humanity to a higher and more equitable civilization. To this world movement there is only one safe guide—the Catholic Church, the spiritual test, for the revolution must be spiritual as well as intellectual. Socialism is the hope of the People. How deep the crime of those who have made the word synonymous with Atheism and disorder. The shallow reasoners of Europe who have dissociated Socialism and Religion have committed an almost unpardonable sin. With the deepest equities underlying the social order, the Catholic Church must always be in the deepest sympathy.⁴¹

Socialism as the "hope of the People," was interpreted by O'Reilly as a dependence on a law of equity deeply embedded in the divine law and proclaimed by the Catholic Church. This, he felt, would restore Christian brotherhood, by which all men would endeavor to resolve the inequalities and injustices in the social order. To the Boston editor, charity on the part of the rich, the gospel of wealth, as some were to preach, was insufficient to cure the social ills that were yearly growing worse, for disorder could be cured only by a larger equity. The principle of equity had far-reaching results, for by it one could countenance the state's social legislation, and moderate state intervention to curb social disorder.

The type of socialism that O'Reilly refused to endorse was a conglomeration of several hazy notions embracing many of the

³⁹ John Lancaster Spalding, Bishop of Peoria, noted the confusion concerning the meaning of the term "socialism" when he remarked "the word Socialism... stands rather for a tendency than for a definite body of principles and methods, and this tendency is one of which men of very different and even opposite opinions approve: and a Socialist may be a theist or an atheist, a spiritualist or a materialist, a Christian or an agnostic. The general implication is the need of greater equality in the condition of human beings. The aim, therefore, is to bring about a social arrangement in which all will receive a fair share of the good things of life..." *Socialism and Labor*, Chicago, 1902, 6-7.

⁴⁰ *Rerum novarum*, pars. 52-56.

⁴¹ *Pilot*, December 15, 1883.

irreligious aspects of contemporary writers, abolition of the classes, investiture of the government with the means of production, abolition of private property, and similar tenets identified from time to time with socialism. He had no use for Communists and Socialists as such, characterizing them as fools and dreamers, since to his mind they "deliberately cut themselves away from and preach the destruction of all that is stable and respectable in humanity." In his criticism of these "isms" he always returned to Catholic doctrine, which he considered the principal support for the preservation of the social order, and he always insisted that it was the duty of Catholic workers to guard the country from misfortune. "There is no change for the better," he remarked, "which cannot be carried out under the Constitution and sanctioned by our religion."⁴²

As much as O'Reilly railed against Marxism, he acknowledged that the author of *Das Kapital* had made some pointed observations regarding the abuses in the capitalistic system. He remarked that in all the theories of reform spreading over 300 years between Sir Thomas More and Marx, "no socialist reasoned closer than this cold and dispassionate, 'man of earthquakes'." Yet to O'Reilly the remedies which the father of modern Communism proposed fell drastically short, because he had appealed solely to "the rational and material part of mankind." Marx had tried to reason out a social life and that "regardless of spiritual influences, making provisions by law for all the improvements that are needed. He ignores the spiritual life in man and communities." He further noted that all the theorists from More to Marx had begun their utopias by abolishing private property as the source of inequality and the deepest error and danger to human society. The editor of the *Pilot*, strongly opposed to any tampering with the rights of private property, concluded that

So long as misery and poverty exist, so long will man speculate and devise for their removal. It is wiser to listen to the proposals even of dreamers than to try to put them down by brute force. There may be a grain of wheat hidden in the chaff of even the wildest theorists. There is only one thing that can stop them: the satisfaction and contentment of the people.⁴³

⁴² *Ibid.*, November 9, 1878; February 19, 1887.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, March 24, 1883. O'Reilly demanded that the current industrial scene be viewed objectively, showing the advantages of the capitalistic system; if this were done there would be no need for socialism. He admitted, however, that ruthless oppression of the worker, expansive living on the part of the rich in the face of the starving masses, and similar injustices could be seeds for communism. *Ibid.*, July 26, 1870; also July 19, 1879.

While O'Reilly condemned Marxism, he showed a certain tolerance for Marx the reformer. He always regarded social reformers with deference, not for the remedies they proposed, but for their serious consideration of social abuses and for their benevolent interest in alleviating human misery. For this reason he had a deep respect for Henry George when the latter first gained prominence, in 1879, with his *Progress and Poverty*, even though O'Reilly did not accept all of George's principles. Not only did he inveigh against the single tax and the reformer's scheme of nationalization of the land, but when George went to Ireland and endeavored to inaugurate his program there O'Reilly rebuked him fiercely, especially after Michael Davitt's head had been turned toward nationalization and away from the Parnell movement.⁴⁴

The Boston editor wavered in his support of the single taxers when the Reverend Edward McGlynn, pastor of St. Stephen's Church in New York, an apostle of social reform, came out in support of George and his theories, and endorsed his campaign for mayor in the face of the explicit command to the contrary of his superior, Archbishop Michael A. Corrigan. O'Reilly could brook no insubordination among the clergy toward their superiors, and he felt that the George movement had been responsible for McGlynn's disobedience.⁴⁵

O'Reilly's initially responsive attitude toward George was extended, in large measure, to Edward Bellamy, when the latter published *Looking Backward* in 1888. The editor of the *Pilot* acknowledged that it was a fascinating story, and a wonderful attempt at the solution of the great social problem of humanity. But O'Reilly would not commend its political principles which, he felt, embodied the idea of paternalism run mad. He acknowledged, however, that the book represented the idea of cooperation.⁴⁶

The political principles which the editor endorsed and acknowl-

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, February 2, 1884.

⁴⁵ Prior to the New York election of 1886, O'Reilly declared that George's victory would have advantages for the old parties, by showing them that men and principles were higher and stronger than organization. He also felt that George might not be able to institute any of his equitable social principles; he added, nonetheless, that "his election would be a gain for fair play and true democracy." *Pilot*, October 9, 1886.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, April 7, 1888. On June 8, 1889, O'Reilly welcomed the appearance of the magazine of the Nationalist Society of Boston, an organization which aimed at reformation of the social order along lines indicated by Bellamy. "While the methods of reform advocated by the Nationalists," he said, "may be criticized as savoring too strongly of paternalism, their purpose is deserving of all praise, and if the reformers be able to correct even a few of the many evils of the present social system they will have done well...."

edged publicly time and time again were those of "democracy as formulated by Jefferson." To O'Reilly this meant that every atom of paternal power not needed for what he termed the "safety of the Union and the intercourse of the population" should be removed from the federal government and be carefully guarded by the states. It also meant an inherent dislike for any "sumptuary and impertinent laws," for he declared that law should only be drawn at disorder, and that all affairs manageable without disorder should be managed without law. Finally, it meant watchfulness against federal legislation on such questions "as education, temperance, irrigation and all other questions that may arise and are sure to arise in the future."⁴⁷

Reluctant as he was to invest the federal government with excessive powers when other solutions were at hand, O'Reilly was forced by the unpalatable facts of daily life to retreat from this idealistic position. Monopolies such as those in coal and railroads, and management's indiscriminate use of hired thugs or ruffians, had subverted the peace and tranquility of society and, as might have been suspected, were condemned by the Boston editor. In the absence of forbearance and charity toward the worker, O'Reilly reluctantly sanctioned governmental intervention for the protection of the people. As early as 1879 he had perceived the advantages that might be gained from governmental control of the railroads. A year later he emphasized this again, when he declared that he did not favor an increase in the powers of the general government where the public good did not absolutely demand it. Yet he concluded that "the need of some action to make the railway autocrats understand that they are the servants, not masters, of the people, grows more urgent every day."⁴⁸

Throughout this discussion he adhered to his original principle that it was better for the people to be governed lightly than strongly. Some powers, however, such as that of the postal authority, he felt, should reside in the central government. And the only reason he would consider the concentration of the telegraph in governmental hands was the fact that men would then be liberated from the insolence of the corporations, which were more of a menace to freedom than the government. In the face of the ill treatment of their miners by the Pennsylvania coal operators, O'Reilly, in a

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, May 31, 1890.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, January 15, 1880; January 18, 1879; April 17, 1886; October 23, 1886; October 30, 1886; February 5, 1887; January 7, 1888; July 28, 1888.

mood of disgust and disappointment, even entertained the idea of nationalizing the mines, although he knew that critics would say that such a proposal savored of paternalism. "Well, paternalism is better than intolerable and irresponsible tyranny," he declared, "and there seems to be no other alternative." He also castigated the "rapacity of the insolent highway robbers who control the total supply of a prime necessary of life."⁴⁹

O'Reilly, indeed, was in fear of trusts and monopolies, for to him the former was socialism under another name. If a trust could gain control over production, he asked, why could not government? He looked for free and fair competition, a good American doctrine, as he said, but if monopolies continued to nullify this doctrine and could not be circumvented in an amicable manner then the private trust "must give way to private co-operation." Paternalism in government was evil, he admitted, "but a greater evil is government by greedy or corrupt speculators for the benefit of insatiable monopoly."⁵⁰

As editor of the *Pilot* O'Reilly surveyed the current American scene in all its aspects and prodded public officials to counteract social abuses. Most of his proposed remedies were inspired by specific events, chiefly in Boston and its vicinity. Such was his advocacy of a reform program to curb some of the abuses in the city's hospitals; re-organization of the municipal charitable institutions; publicizing the Tewkesbury Almshouse scandal exposed by Ben Butler and others in 1883; his plea for the protection of women workers; and similar manifestations of concern for the interests of the poor, orphans and invalids. He also discussed at length such topics as civil rights, woman's suffrage—of which he was a vigorous opponent—prison reform, alcoholism and the universal brotherhood of man.

In retrospect the Boston editor seemed, perhaps, every inch the revolutionary, but at heart he was really a reconstructionist. George Parsons Lathrop once remarked of him, "I have never known any one who showed such deep and searching and wide interest in the welfare, comfort and progress of the whole human race."⁵¹ According to Lathrop, O'Reilly possessed an almost infinite compassion for the suffering of mankind, and an

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, January 28, 1888; May 15, 1880; September 1, 1883.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, August 11, 1888.

⁵¹ Lathrop to Editor of the *Critic*, New London, August 11, 1890. Quoted in the *Critic* XIV (August 16, 1890), 83.

unlimited fund of hope for the alleviation of those sufferings. Sometimes, however, he uttered terrible theories looking toward the destruction of human society as it now exists. These theories were only a sort of rendrock, intended merely to blow up the granite walls of inert prejudices, and make an opening for broader paths of progress and enlightenment; but they caused him to be misunderstood.⁵²

As he advised others, so O'Reilly himself put his ear to the rich earth, listening, as it were, to the blood stream of humanity, and learning where it was trying to flow, and what and where were its barriers.⁵³ He developed a deeper understanding of mankind, which enabled him to inculcate principles of charity and justice in the daily lives of his contemporaries.

In many respects, O'Reilly the social commentator was in advance of his time. He never became, however, the center of a social reform movement nor a part of the *avant garde* through vigorous political action. And here his advice to Henry George—that the duty of the reformer is to teach, not to do—was his guiding principle. Furthermore, he insisted that social reformers should never meddle in politics, for, as he said, politics was the service of the social conditions as they were, whereas the reformer had to do with social conditions as they ought to be. To O'Reilly, reform was not achieved by power from above, but rather by pressure from below. When the masses had learned what the reformer had taught, they would act.⁵⁴

For several years prior to his death he had been engaged in writing a work on social philosophy which was to have given expression to his theories, a work said to have resembled in some respect Henry George's *Progress and Poverty* and Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward*.⁵⁵ The idealistic overtones of these two works

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ O'Reilly to a friend [J.] *Atlantic Monthly* LXVI (October, 1890), 572-574.

⁵⁴ *Pilot*, September 14, 1889.

⁵⁵ An unidentified newspaper clipping announced that O'Reilly would soon bring out a book entitled, *The Country With a Roof*. "Somebody who ought to know," the reporter said, "tells me that the book is made-up of epigrams which tersely express some of Mr. O'Reilly's rather radical views on social questions. *The Country With a Roof* is, I am told, the wide world as it wags and is governed today. All the common people who have to struggle and toil for their daily bread are assembled on the roof, and the privileged few are sheltered beneath the roof, feasting on the comfort and luxuries that can only be had with wealth, all unmindful of the sufferings of their fellow beings who are shivering over their heads. But as time goes on and the rich grow richer, and the poor poorer, the crowd of people on the roof become so large that the rafters go down with a crash. Then what become of the privileged few underneath? This is the problem O'Reilly is supposed to solve." Boston College Irish Collection: O'Reilly Scrapbook.

must have appealed to O'Reilly, for as an idealist he firmly believed that

sometime in the future mankind will have a social order based on justice and not on expediency, in which the spiritual virtues of generosity, mercy, kindness, truth, and sacrifice shall be as publicly respected as the intellectual virtues of shrewdness, selfishness, thrift, ambition, and boldness.⁵⁶

Yet because of the seeming hopelessness of the conflict between a generous idealism for the good of humanity and the selfish indifference which controls so many men, O'Reilly died in many ways a sadly disillusioned man. There was a grain of truth in Lathrop's remark that his end came not from the failure of the heart, but from the failure of society.⁵⁷

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⁵⁶ O'Reilly to Editor of the *Boston Post*, n.d. Boston College Irish Collection: O'Reilly Scrapbook.

⁵⁷ *Critic*, XIV (August 16, 1890).

A Note on the Muckrakers

The story of the Muckrakers is familiar to all students of American history and is included in almost all standard American history texts. These accounts discuss the need for reform, the rise of the popular magazines, and mention the more prominent names--Steffens, Tarbell, Baker, Phillips, Lawson, and Hendrick. All accounts generally agree that the movement was short-lived; and that by 1910 muckraking had declined, and by that date most of the magazines which specialized in this literature of exposure had either turned to new subjects or had ceased publication. In discussing the reasons for the rise and the rapid decline of this movement, the authors advance similar explanations and draw similar conclusions.

The writers all lay stress on the care, thoroughness, and documentation that the publishers demanded in order to make each article accurate and trustworthy. One notes that "S. S. McClure, probably the most able and energetic of the publishers, set a good example for the rest by encouraging his writers to do the most pains-taking research before they burst into print." Another declares that "McClure imposed only two standards--accuracy and readability." A third says that "fearing legal reprisals, the Muckraking magazines went to great pains and expense to check their materials--paying as much as \$3,000 to verify a single Tarbell article. None of the publishers ever suffered an adverse judgment in a major libel suit." Yet another concluded that "the muckraking followed the method of pitiless exposure supported only by the facts. None of the authors, or publishers for whom they wrote, lost a single important libel suit."¹

¹ The general histories, monographs, and texts examined include Thomas A. Bailey, *The American Pageant*, Boston, 1956; Leland D. Baldwin, *The Stream of American History*, Vol. II, New York, 1952; Louis Filler, *Crusaders for American Liberalism*, Yellow Springs, Ohio, 1939; Wesley M. Gewehr and Others, *American Civilization*, New York, 1957; John D. Hicks, *The American Nation*, New York, 1955; Richard Hofstadter and Others, *The United States*, New York, 1957; Arthur S. Link, *American Epoch*, New York, 1955; Samuel E. Morison and Henry S. Commager, *The Growth of the American Republic*, vol. II, New York, 1950; Cornelius Regier, *The Era of the Muckrakers*, Chapel Hill, N.C., 1932; Robert E. Riegel and David F. Long, *The American Story*, New York, 1955; T. Harry Williams, Richard N. Current, and Frank Freidel, *A History of the United States Since 1865*, New York, 1959; and George Harmon Knoles, *The United States, A History Since 1896*, New York, 1959.

These conclusions leave a somewhat inaccurate impression. There was at least one libel suit that cost a major muckraking periodical dearly. It involved a leading publisher, S. S. McClure, a leading magazine, *McClure's*, and one of the more prominent journalists, Ray Stannard Baker. The article concerned was one of the most quoted exposés of the entire movement: Baker's "The Railroads on Trial." Evidently many writers have overlooked this case which perhaps had more far-reaching effects than previously thought.² Its significant facts are as follows.³

In 1905, Baker was pursuing material in the Chicago area for his railroad article, concentrating chiefly on the activities of the great meat packers, the Armour-Swift-Morris combine. In a conversation with Wisconsin Governor Robert M. La Follette, "Fighting Bob" told Baker that a Milwaukee industrialist, one Emanuel L. Philipp, might well serve as an additional example of a rebater in his forthcoming article. La Follette recalled a report given him the previous year by railroad commissioner John W. Thomas which had linked Philipp with a number of rebate payments made by the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad to a refrigerator car company. The governor provided Baker with a copy of the report and commented that he had used some of the material in his campaign speeches in the fall of 1904.

Without consulting Philipp or checking the story at all in Milwaukee, Baker incorporated the charges in his article under the subheading of "Rebates to Milwaukee Brewers," and even included an imaginary conversation to illustrate how Philipp solicited his rebates. The reference to Philipp and his Union Refrigerator Transit Company occupied less than one page of the article and sought to provide, as Baker explained, a "peculiarly effective illustration of the rebating technique."⁴

Unfortunately for McClure and Baker, the journalist had been guilty of carelessness in his investigation and an utter confusion

² Of all the secondary accounts consulted, only Regier gives any indication that he was aware of the Philipp-McClure Case. He quotes John S. Phillips (one of McClure's editors) as saying "So thorough was the work then, that, although we dealt with libelous materials all the time, there was only one suit for libel sustained against the magazine, and this suit was successful simply because a document on which an article was based turned out to be inaccurate." Regier makes no further comment or explanation concerning the case. See Regier, *The Era of the Muckrakers*, 211.

³ For a full account of this case, its background and ramifications, see Robert S. Maxwell, *Emanuel L. Philipp: Wisconsin Stalwart*, Madison, State Historical Society of Wisconsin Press, 1959.

⁴ Ray Stannard Baker, "The Railroads on Trial," *McClure's Magazine*, 26 (January, 1906), 326.

regarding several refrigerator car companies. The vouchers of the C. M. & St. P. R. R. concerned payments not to Philipp's Union Refrigerator Transit Company but to the Northern Refrigerator Transit Company which was almost wholly owned by one of the family who also owned the Schlitz Brewing Company. In fact, the Union Refrigerator Transit Company of Wisconsin was not organized until some months after these transactions had taken place. Its predecessor company, the Union Refrigerator Transit Company of Kentucky, was in the car leasing business and leased refrigerator cars to a number of companies including the Northern Refrigerator Transit Company. Philipp, a rising entrepreneur with many activities, was the salaried president of the Kentucky company, the manager of a Pabst-Schlitz lumbering enterprise in Mississippi, and an employee of the parent Schlitz company in Milwaukee. He was listed as a vice-president of the Northern Refrigerator Transit Company, but held only one share of stock, was paid no salary, and had no duties except of a routine clerical nature. The profits and rebates, if any, had all gone to the owner. All of this had transpired prior to the passage of the Elkins Act, February, 1903. In August of that year, Philipp had severed all connection with the Schlitz interests, organized his own refrigerator car company, and purchased the cars of the Kentucky company, which became inoperative. Ironically, Philipp had been active during 1904 and 1905 in prodding the United States Attorney-General to take stronger action under the Elkins Act against certain companies whose continuing rebate practices were creating an unfair discrimination against him and his young company.

Upon reading the article, Philipp at once protested to both McClure and Baker, demanding a retraction and an apology. He also discussed the libel laws of New York with his attorneys with a view toward a possible suit should the magazine refuse to make a proper explanation. At Philipp's insistence, Commissioner Thomas rechecked his report of 1904, and, after having the nature and relationship of the several companies made clear to him, revised his report and affirmed that neither Philipp nor the Union Refrigerator Transit Company was involved in rebating.

Baker soon made a return trip to Wisconsin and this time called on Philipp. There the industrialist spent a long day with the reporter going over the history of his refrigerator car company and the nature of its business. He offered to allow Baker to examine the company's books in detail and urged Baker to visit Chicago and go over the C. M. & St. P. R. R. records and to visit St. Louis

where he could see the books of the old Kentucky company. Baker declined all these offers, expressing his satisfaction that he now had the complete story and indicated that a suitable apology would be forthcoming, based on his conversation with Philipp and the revised report of the Wisconsin railroad commissioner.⁵

Evidently Baker was unconvinced. To him, the various refrigerator car companies seemed to have been made deliberately confusing—"veritable wheels within wheels." He was certain that his accusation was substantially true, even though it might be technically inaccurate. In his "explanation" which appeared in the April, 1906, issue of *McClure's*, Baker in effect said that he had been wrong when he said that Philipp had accepted rebates with his right hand. He should have said that he had accepted them with his left hand. He acknowledged that there was no evidence linking the Union Refrigerator Transit Company of Wisconsin with rebate payments, but he stressed Philipp's position as vice-president of the Northern Refrigerator Transit Company at the same time he was president of the Union Refrigerator Transit Company of Kentucky. In short, Baker deliberately invited a libel suit, certain that his charges could be substantiated. Actually, he was confident that Philipp would not dare to sue.

Philip at once advised his attorneys to proceed with the suit and wrote Baker that he regarded his corrections and explanations "just as libelous as the original article." The case, heard in the Federal District Court of the Southern District of New York, did not come to trial until March, 1908. Philipp brought with him voluminous records from his refrigerator car company and from the railroads involved. In the testimony, he proved to be an excellent witness, explaining the activities of his companies clearly and reviewing his efforts to prod the Attorney-General into more vigorous enforcement of the Elkins Act. Regarding Baker, Philipp insisted that the reporter had set out to write a sensational article that would aid La Follette. It was deliberately biased and inspired by malice. Baker, Philipp concluded, did not want to learn the truth.⁶

⁵ In the course of their conversation, Baker queried Philipp concerning his reaction to these charges when La Follette had first made them during the 1904 campaign. Philipp replied that "he thought" he had denounced and denied them at once in the press, but he was not sure. He had taken no further action because of the heated nature of the campaign and because the governor held no substantial property. Baker went away probably thinking that Philipp had not dared deny them then or sue La Follette. Philipp, however, had issued a denial which appeared in the *Milwaukee Sentinel*, November 6, 1904.

⁶ From the manuscript copy of the testimony in *Philipp vs. S. S. McClure* in the Emanuel L. Philipp papers in the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin.

Baker and McClure, despite their best efforts, were unable to find additional evidence to bolster the charges, so they based their defense on Railroad Commissioner Thomas's report and the confusion of names in the several refrigerator car companies. But Baker's refusal to make more than token corrections in his second article evidently militated against him in the minds of the jurors and his scanty knowledge of the refrigerator car industry adversely impressed the court. After some two weeks of testimony and arguments, the jury, following a short deliberation, found for the plaintiff in the sum of \$15,000. The case was at once appealed to the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals which, in May, 1909, affirmed the judgment with costs. This terminated the case.⁷

The McClure company promptly settled with Philipp's attorneys. The damages and costs totaled more than \$18,800. In addition, McClure had to pay the very considerable costs of the unsuccessful defense efforts of his attorneys and the expenses of the last minute search for additional evidence. It is estimated that the case cost the defendants, apart from the costs of the original article and Baker's salary, between \$35,000 and \$40,000. All of this was paid by McClure.

The effects were devastating on *McClure's Magazine*. The leading specialists, Steffens, Baker, John Philipps, and Tarbell had already left *McClure's* to publish the *American Magazine*, and McClure had begun to de-emphasize muckraking. After the Philipp case, he abandoned it completely.⁸ The magazine encountered financial reverses, advertising dropped off, and shortly the control of *McClure's* passed to other hands. The history of other muckraking periodicals was similar. By 1910, most had turned from muckraking or were out of business.⁹

Yet, this case seems to have been completely ignored. Writers advance various other reasons and theories for the sudden decline of the muckrakers. One scholar is of the opinion that muckraking "turned into yellow journalism around 1906 . . . soon readers tired of the excitement . . . and by 1908, the entire movement was dis-

⁷ *Milwaukee Sentinel*, March 28, 1908; *S. S. McClure* (plaintiff in error) vs. *E. L. Philipp* (defendant in error), 170 *Fed. 910* (1909); 96 *C. C. A. 86* (1909).

⁸ John M. Whitehead, Wisconsin attorney and politician, said that McClure stated after the trial that "muckraking was ended as far as he was concerned." See Whitehead to Ralph H. Gabriel, April 22, 1914, in the John M. Whitehead Papers, State Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin.

⁹ Samuel S. McClure, *My Autobiography*, New York, 1914, 245; Filler, *Crusaders for American Liberalism*, 368-370.

credited." Another talks of bank pressures, foreclosure of loans, loss of advertisers, and "poor business methods" as the chief causes of the decline of muckraking. Yet another calls muckraking a sort of "fad." A fourth advances the hypothesis that "perhaps muckraking was stopped—magazines fell into the hands of their creditors." They agree that by 1910 American people were tired of it. None of these writers discusses the Philipp vs. McClure case as a cause for the decline of this literature of exposure. Nowhere is litigation or the threat of litigation advanced as a reason for the sudden loss in interest in muckraking.¹⁰

Baker in his autobiography, written years later, recalled the Philipp case with obvious lack of enthusiasm. Even then, he was certain that he had been right but merely unable to prove his charges. Philipp's subsequent career in which he became a Republican leader, an intimate friend of President Taft, and a three-term governor of Wisconsin during the First World War, did nothing to change Baker's mind. Nowhere did he intimate that he had made a grievous error.¹¹

In this particular case at least, one of the most widely publicized and most quoted muckraking articles, by one of the foremost muckrakers, was neither carefully written nor thoroughly documented. Nor was it, in this respect, accurate or trustworthy. The net effect of the article was to embarrass the author and to cause the publisher a serious financial reversal. This short note does not intend to do more than to suggest that this libel case against McClure hastened the decline of enthusiasm for muckraking. Perhaps there were still other cases that had similar results.

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¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 370; Link, *American Epoch*, 76; Gewehr, *American Civilization*, 272-273; Regier, *Era of the Muckrakers*, 194-216.

¹¹ Ray Stannard Baker, *American Chronicle*, New York, 1945, 207-212. In his autobiography, McClure does not mention the Philipp case.

Documents

Some War Letters of the Bishop of Mobile, 1861-1865

The Catholic Church was the only major religious body in the United States which was not split into Northern and Southern divisions by the causes which led to the Civil War or by the war itself. Even with the outbreak of hostilities there was no official break and hence after the conflict was over there were no ties to be rebound and no apologies were necessary. This is not to say that the war did not disrupt or at least seriously impair the unity that had characterized the Church prior to the conflict.

The blockade of the Confederate ports of entry worked a hardship upon the Church in the South. Supplies of all types necessary for carrying on the services and functions of the church became scarce and some of the rites and ceremonies of the church had to be seriously curtailed. As the Federal forces occupied more and more of the Confederacy, communication between members of the hierarchy became extremely difficult and in some cases impossible. These and other problems raised and accentuated by the war are illustrated in the letters written by John Quinlan, Bishop of Mobile, to John Mary Odin, Archbishop of New Orleans.

John Quinlan, second Bishop of Mobile, was born at Cloyne, County Cork, Ireland, on October 19, 1826, and was educated in private schools near his native place.¹ In 1844 when he was eighteen he came to the United States and studied for the priesthood at Mt. St. Mary's of the West, Cincinnati, Ohio, and at Mt. St. Mary's College, Emmitsburg, Maryland. On August 30, 1852, he was ordained by Archbishop John Purcell of Cincinnati, and assigned to missionary work at Piqua, Ohio. Two years later he became assistant pastor at St. Patrick's Church in Cincinnati and shortly thereafter was made the superior of Mt. St. Mary's of the

¹ This sketch of Quinlan is based upon the following: *National Cyclopaedia of American Biography*, 37 vols., New York, 1852-1951, XIII, 499-500; Charles G. Herbermann, et al., editors, *The Catholic Encyclopedia* 15 vols., New York, 1911, X, 411; Thomas M. Owens, *History of Alabama and Dictionary of Alabama Biography*, 4 vols., Chicago, 1921, IV, 1403; John H. O'Donnell, *The Catholic Hierarchy of the United States, 1790-1922*, Washington, 1922, 56-57.

West. On December 4, 1859, he was consecrated Bishop of Mobile by Archbishop Antoine Blanc of New Orleans in St. Louis Cathedral in that city.

It was a poor diocese indeed which Quinlan had been called to administer. The fourteen schools and twelve churches had only eight diocesan priests. Better to serve his people he soon made a trip to Ireland whence he brought eleven young candidates for the priesthood. He also introduced the Sisters of St. Joseph and the Sisters of Mercy into the Mobile Diocese. Later he invited the Benedictines from St. Vincent's Abbey, Pennsylvania, to settle at Cullman, Alabama.

Shortly after he assumed his new post, the Civil War broke out and added to the burdens which Quinlan already bore. Despite the difficulties of transportation imposed by the hostilities, he continued the annual visitation of his diocese, for only the bishop could administer the rite of confirmation. An ardent Confederate, Quinlan was mindful of the needs of those in military service and furnished chaplains from his small number of priests and supplied nuns for hospital work. Following the Battle of Shiloh, he, himself, hurried to the battleground on a special train and administered to the temporal and spiritual wants of the soldiers of both the North and South.

In spite of the handicaps which marked the early days of his long episcopate, Quinlan accomplished much. He built the portico of the Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception in Mobile and founded St. Patrick's and St. Mary's churches in that city. In addition he established churches in nine other towns in Alabama. While on a visit to Rome in 1881, he contracted the Roman fever and a severe cold which completely broke his health. In January, 1883, he reached the United States but passed away on March 9, at New Orleans.

The letters presented here are from the archives of the Archdiocese of New Orleans and are published with the gracious permission of the Reverend Thomas T. McAvoy, C.S.C., Archivist of the University of Notre Dame where the papers are deposited. Other than the addition of punctuation marks for clarity, the letters are printed as written in the hand of Quinlan.

WILLARD E. WIGHT

Georgia Institute of Technology

Mobile May 22, 1861

Rt Rev & dear Sir

Having just returned from a missionary tour of several weeks, I heard a few days ago of your elevation to the archepiscopal See of New Orleans. You will remember, Monseigneur, that at the last Council when our late lamented Monseigneur Blanc had asked our opinion as to who should be pleasing to us suffragans, as his coadjutor & successor, that I proposed your Grace, seconded by Bishop [William Henry] Elder [of Natchez]—you arose & *with tears* besought me to withdraw my recommendation. I am now exceedingly glad that Providence has brought about your appointment.² You may rely on the most cordial cooperation of your suffragans,³ all of whom, I am sure, are rejoiced at your elevation—As one of them, I take the present opportunity to congratulate you & to beg you most earnestly to accept & put an end to the widowhood of our archdiocese as soon as possible. By doing so you will advance greatly the plan of religion, & rejoice the heart of one, at least, of those who owe you, as Metropolitan, a sincere & devoted attachment.

I am Most Rev & dear Sir
Yours devotedly in our Lord
John, Bishop of Mobile

Most Rev. J. M. Odin, D.D.
Archbp. Elect of N. Orleans

Same day May 22, 1861

Monseigneur

As I was about to send the above to the Post Office, I read your note of invitation to New Orleans, along with the pleasing news that you have, God directing, accepted. I will start on Friday morning to assist at your installation, deferring until after this occurrence some appointments previously made.

Again yours devotedly in God
John, Bp. Mobile

² The Papal Bulls translating Odin from Galveston to New Orleans were sent to Francis Patrick Kenrick, Archbishop of Baltimore who forwarded them to Galveston. Odin wished to decline because of his age, his lack of knowledge, his inability to cope with the problems, and his unwillingness to leave his people, his priests, and his religious in Texas. He advised Kenrick that "if you do not assure me positively that I would commit a sin by sending back the Bulls, I will return them." Odin to Kenrick April 22, 1861, New Orleans Papers, Archives of the University of Notre Dame. Kenrick told a correspondent that he pronounced Odin's statement rash "but refused to determine its sinfulness." Kenrick to Patrick N. Lynch, Bishop of Charleston, May 12, 1861, Archives of the Diocese of Charleston, Envelope 129.

³ The Province of New Orleans contained the archdiocese of New Orleans and the suffragan bishoprics of Galveston, Little Rock, Mobile, Natchez and Natchitoches. *Metropolitan Catholic Almanac and Laity's Directory for the United States, Canada, and the British Provinces, 1861*, Baltimore, 1861, 49.

Mobile May 23, 1861

Most Rev & dear Sir

I wrote yesterday stating that I would start on tomorrow for New Orleans to be present at your installation: I wrote under the influence of a great desire to be present. But afterwards reflecting on the number of disappointments that my going over would involve, I today telegraphed my inability to go. I now give the reasons. I administered tonsure & minor orders yesterday to five of my young men at Spring Hill Seminary, intending to confer *Subdeaconship*, *Deaconship* & *Priesthood* on Friday, Saturday & Sunday morning next. This is *ember week*—the Seminarists are in Retreat, kindly given by one of the Jesuit Fathers. I announced last Sunday the ordination of two young priests, to take place next Sunday morning at the Cathedral; also that I would give Confirmation at St. Vincent's & St. Joseph's Churches next Sunday, forenoon & afternoon. New Monseigneur I am sure you will agree with me in thinking that to put off all these arrangements would be morally impossible. The children are in immediate preparation—in retreat &c for Confirmation: the Seminarists are in retreat; it is moreover the last week of the Pascal time, and all these arrangements are already *published*. I am sure in the circumstances you will not only *not* blame me, but you would, knowing the circumstances attending my absence from home next Sunday, feel annoyed at my going to New Orleans, at the expense of such disappointment. Is it possible to delay your installation? a week? I should like very much to be present. All the Suffragans, I presume to remark, would like to be present; but with so short a notice it is hardly possible that Bishop [Andrew] Byrne [of Little Rock] could be present.⁴ If I should be needed in any matter of business connected with the Province, I could go over Monday morning, if telegraphed to in the meantime. Regretting exceedingly, Monseigneur, my inability to be present, for the reasons adduced at your merited installation, in any other way than by my prayers, which I shall offer up most fervently.

I remain

Yours devotedly in God
John, Bishop of Mobile

Mobile, July 15, 1861

Most Rev. & dear Sir

After an absence of about six weeks in the northeastern part of my Diocese, during which time I received almost no news from Mobile, I returned a few days ago. I found your kind letter awaiting me. I regret very much that I had not received it earlier for, I assure you, I would have deferred my visitation in order to meet you & my Episcopal brothers in

⁴ In spite of the inability of most of the suffragan bishops to attend, the ceremony of installation for Odin took place on Trinity Sunday, 1861, with only the Bishop of Natchez present. *New Orleans Catholic Standard*, May 26, 1861, quoted in *New York Tablet*, June 8, 1861.

New Orleans. Monseigneur, I know no priest at present, whom I could recommend for Galveston; I have the fullest confidence in your *Knowledge, prudence & discretion*. Therefore I most heartily endorse the choice of candidates you mention viz "V. Rev. Mr. [Claud Marie] Dubuis, Rev. Peter Parizot, O.M.I., and very Rev. [Louis Claud Marie] Chambodut."⁵ You will be glad to hear that we are taking measures for the immediate erection of three new churches in several parts of the Diocese of Mobile. Civil commotions may disturb the world, but God's holy Church has her mission and nothing can prevent her in the accomplishment of it. Is not the death of the Apostle of Revolution, Cavour, a manifest evidence of God's interference in behalf of his Vicar, Pius?⁶ I hope it may be for the better thinking of some [sic] some many deluded men. Poor Mr. Houlehan⁷ left Mobile before I reached here; he had not much hope of being kindly received by me. I certainly, under no circumstances, would receive him to a trial. One scandal does more harm to the church, than a thousand virtuous acts do good. I start again on my visitations, by appointment already made, about the 1st of August, and I shall be absent about two months. When I return I shall take the earliest opportunity to offer you, My dear Monseigneur, my congratulations in person. Best regards to all the Rev^d Clergy of the Cathedral, and accept for yourself, the expressions of my warmest regards & sincere devotedness.

Most devotedly in God
Your Obt. Serv^t & Brother
John, Bishop of Mobile

Most Rev. J.M. Odin, D.D.
Archbishop of New Orleans

Mobile Monday Oct. 28, 1861

Monseigneur—

Your kind favour of the 23rd inst was handed to me just now. It affords me great pleasure to inform you that I, at present see nothing to hinder me from complying with your kind request, so you may expect me over, God assisting, to take part in your investiture of the Pallium & to preach to the English people, on the 24th of November next.⁸ I have

⁵ At this time, the bishops of a province in which there was a vacancy submitted to the Holy See the names of three candidates for the office. While it was not mandatory that one of the three be elevated to the episcopacy, it was not infrequent for one of the three to be named. In this instance Dubuis became the Bishop of Galveston.

⁶ Camillo Benso, Count di Cavour (1810-1861) was a leading figure in the unification of Italy and thus was considered responsible for the loss of the Papal States.

⁷ Probably the Reverend Dan Houlehan who in 1861 was assistant pastor of St. Theresa's Church, New Orleans. *Metropolitan Directory*, 109. What the scandal was, is unknown.

⁸ In November, 1861, Odin was invested with the pallium, a band of white wool, worn on the shoulders, with four purple crosses worked on it, as a sign of his office. During the ceremony, Quinlan preached in

just been talking to Mr. St. Cyr, formerly of Galveston & now of Nice, Italy. In his efforts to reach the South, thru the Lincoln lines, he was treated with every indignity. You will hear his narrative from himself; indeed you will get this at his hands, as he has kindly consented to take it.

With all respect, Monseigneur.
Yours devotedly in our Lord
John, Bishop of Mobile.

Most Rev. J. M. Odin, D.D.
Archbp of N. Orleans

Most Rev^d Archbishop Odin, D.D.
New Orleans
Louisiana

Monseigneur:

Father Ozamia will hand you this. The blockade cutting me off from communication with you; and, at the same, information concerning a few matters of importance being absolutely and speedily needed, I have sent him on, with two sisters of our Visitation Convent, on business of their order, to confer with you and bring me back the desired information. In my appointment to the Diocese of Mobile, the Episcopal Faculties⁹ were conveyed to me in a few lines viz. "The Faculties of your Predecessor Monseigneur Portier, are continued to you, whether ordinary or Extraordinary." Now what do these lines mean? Is it that Bishop Portier's Faculties were continued to me, for the *unexpired term only*? or is it that these faculties were given to me for the usual period of ten years commencing with *my* Episcopal appointment? If the *first* be the meaning, then I am now destitute of regular Faculties, as the term of Bishop Portier's Faculties expired on the 1st of Jany 1863! If the second, I have yet these Faculties and can exercise them. In my present state of doubt in the matter, I cannot, with a safe conscience exercise any of the Extraordinary Faculties. Have you got a renewal of the Faculties which expired 1st Jany. 1863, and what are the changes & modifications if any? In regard to the Baptism of Adults, the time allowed for the use of the Formula for Infants in their case, had I believed elapsed. Must we use the long "Form for Adults," or have you obtained from the Holy See an extension, in point of time, of the privilege of still using the "Infant Form," in the Baptism of Adults?

English, Father Napoleon Perché preached in French, and the Bishop of Natchez made the presentation. *New Orleans Daily Picayune*, November 26, 1861.

⁹ In Roman Catholic Canon Law a faculty is "the authority, privilege, or permission, to perform an act or function. In a broad sense, a faculty is a certain power, whether based on one's own right, or received as a favour from another, of validly or lawfully doing some action." *Catholic Encyclopaedia*, V, 748-749.

and can the privilege be shared by your suffragans? I am totally ignorant of what may have transpired in Rome, for the last three years concerning Ecclesiastical affairs affecting our Province, and will be thankful to you by sending thru Father Ozamia this and any other Ecclesiastical instructions you have received.

Praying God for a return of peaceful times, and committing myself and Diocese to your spiritual solicitude

Your obt. Ser^t & brother in God
I am, Monseigneur—
John Quinlan
Bishop of Mobile

/Endorsed/ Recd Aug. the 23d 1863
Ans'd " " 27

Mobile, July 29, 1864

Most Rev^d & dear Sir

It was only about a week ago since I heard that you had written me *two* letters about Ecclesiastical matters, and that you were very much surprised that I wrote you no answer. I assure you, Monseigneur, I never received those letters: the only ones that came to me from your hand were two or three "letters of Introduction" by parties from New Orleans; which, from their contents, did not seem in any way to demand a reply. The letters which you wrote me early last year, containing answers to certain questions which I proposed for your consideration, I recd and answered in terms of gratitude and thankfulness. You, perhaps did not get these responses; as I sent thru those uncertain channels which lie open [?] to correspondents. By a lady lately come from New Orleans, I have been told that you desired faculties to be given to Priests from New Orleans for Pensacola and other places within the federal lines, within my jurisdiction. Monseigneur, I always looked upon a reciprocal concession of faculties for Priests, *in good standing*, of Mobile and New Orleans, as a fixed arrangement between us. I have always had this impression: where I got it from I can't tell. This arrangement has been entered into between Bishop Elder and Bishop [Augustin] Verot [of Savannah] & myself. And if you have not *hitherto* considered it as existing between yourself and me, I desire very much that you would now accept it, & that it become a rule for our Priests. Father Miller, I hear, has left Pensacola & gone to Philadelphia not to return. He could not get a pass to confer *in person* with me, his Bishop! I did [not] imagine that the Federal authorities carried their measures so far as to Blockade God's Church. F. Miller desired me to go to the Navy yard to administer Confirmation. I wrote him that I desired vehemently to see our poor people there & administer the Holy Sacrament, if I recd from the Federal Commandant at [the] Navy-yard a passport to *go in and come out of his lines*, without his exacting of me any condition of a political nature, such as taking the oath. I have yet recd no answer; so I presume the Federal authorities refuse to comply

with my request. I am sorry for this, as it hinders [me] from giving to my catholic children of the Diocese of Mobile, as well as their own Catholic soldiers, the consolations of their holy Faith.

In these circumstances, Monseigneur, I beg your charity to send a priest occasionally to the Navy yard. I am sure Father Chalon¹⁰ would try to find time for an occasional trip there, for the *old memories* of this Diocese. Please give my best thanks to Father Chalon for the two bottles of oil, which he sent us by Father Miller. They came safely and just in time for Holy Thursday; also for some little presents sent lately by a lady from New Orleans. I will not soon forget his kindness. I am told that there are in the hands of some one in Natchez letters from Rome for me, sent by your Grace. I have not yet received them. We have been all panting [sic] here, through your New Orleans exiled children to hear of your illness. But thank God, the tidings come now that you are convalescent. Hoping to hear from you soon, and of your improved health,

I am, Monseigneur, until we meet in better times,

Your obt. Sevt & bro in God
John Quinlan
Bishop of Mobile

Most Rev^d Dr. Odin
Archbp of
New Orleans
La

I hope this will reach you, by
the very uncertain channel thru
which it goes

¹⁰ Father Gabriel Chalon, said to have been Quinlan's cousin, was appointed chancellor and secretary of his diocese by Odin at his installation. Jeremiah J. O'Connell, *Catholicity in Georgia and the Carolinas*, New York, 1879, 589; Roger Baudier, *The Catholic Church in Louisiana*, New Orleans, 1939, 412.

Book Reviews

Canada and the United States: The Civil War Years. By Robin W. Winks. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1960. Pp. xviii, 430. \$6.50.

Yale University's Professor Winks set for himself the difficult task of examining, in one volume, British North American—United States relationships during the tempestuous years of the Civil War. It is quite clear from the outset that Winks does not intend to be misled by the friendly-neighbor, "century-of-peace" formula that so unthinkingly is popularly accepted by United Statesians who really know very little about their northern neighbor.

His study of "Canadian-American" problems is mounted on the sandstone base of popular opinion, one of the most hazardous areas an historian can try to re-create. Yet Professor Winks has done remarkably well here, showing popular opinion in all its fickleness and subtlety without resorting to the comfort of generalization, as I shall in the next sentence. During the period of secession, he notes, opinion in British America generally favored the North, after Sumter, the South, and Lincoln's assassination, the Union. That British America feared forceable annexation, and that this spurred its efforts toward the establishment of a federal union of its own, is well demonstrated and elaborately documented.

Nearly every irritant and problem between these two cousins from the crimping of Canadians into the Northern armies, numerous border violations, the *Trent* Affair, second *Chesapeake* Affair, the St. Albans raid, through almost every rumor, is carefully searched out and evaluated. The documentation is copious and accurate, there is no bibliography, but the sixteen page note on sources is valuable.

The rhetoric of the first few chapters is laborious, and Winks tends to repetitiousness, but he warms up after the first fifty pages. No two historians will ever agree on every point, and this reviewer cannot accept all the details of the kidnapping of Sioux chiefs from the Red River settlements. This is, however, a needed, objective, detailed, and up-to-date work. Not only Canadian-American relations, but to a lesser degree imperial relations, and the diplomatic skirmishing between Blue and Gray in Canada are skillfully sketched, primarily from manuscript sources. This is a positive contribution to both diplomatic and Civil War history and is a tribute to Dr. Winks thoroughness.

ROBERT H. JONES

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El Patronato Regio de Indias y La Santa Sede, en Santo Toribio de Mogrovejo, 1581-1606. By Vicente Rodríguez Valencia. Iglesia Nacional Española, Roma. Distributed by José Porter, Librero, Barcelona. Publicaciones del Inst. Esp. de Est. Esclesiásticos. 1957. Pp. 260.

Santo Toribio was born in 1539 a member of a noble family in the countryside of León. As a layman he pursued an intense education in law at Valladolid and later at Salamanca, where he had done two years of doctoral studies when Philip II in 1578 presented him for the arch-

bishopric of Lima. Gregory XIII confirmed him on March 16, 1579, and dispensed him so that he could receive major orders and consecration immediately. For five years previously he held membership in the Inquisition with his special care, Granada. He took possession of the See of Lima in 1581.

Ever loyal to his sovereign, to whom he sent complete records of all his major moves, he nevertheless came into sharp conflict with the king and the Council of the Indies over their conduct of the Patronato Real. His own revelations to them of his continuous private communication with the popes led to a major expansion in their use of the *Pase Regio* after 1592. His insistence on direct dependence on the papacy and exact fulfillment of its decisions produced friction with the crown on three issues: his right to call provincial councils when so ordered by the Tridentine decrees and the mandate of the pope; his duty to visit the dioceses of his province of Lima; and his immediate obligation to supervise the funds of the churches and hospitals. On these three sectors Madrid operated as the delegated vicar of the Holy See. Toribio counterattacked, and remained steadfast in his episcopal conduct—and this despite a too frequent subserviency shown by his theological advisors in favor of the royal patron.

The book is projected against the background of the famous Junta de Madrid held in 1568. In that year the Patronato practice underwent a thorough examination both in Rome and in Madrid, and it was a time of crisis. The pope wanted a nuncio resident in the Indies. Philip countered by proposing a Patriarch who would reside under his eye in Madrid. Neither suggestion was accepted. The crown advanced its employment of patronage into the practical, though unspoken, claim to a full vicariate over the imperial church. The archbishop fought valiantly to stem that dangerous tide. He won in his lifetime by pure determination to do his duty, though the situation was to be repeated in future years.

The merit of Rodríguez lies in presenting irrefragible proof of the crown's attitude. Leturia had preceded him in the position, but he conducted so complete an examination of the case that it should no longer be controverted. An interesting sidelight is his conclusion (pages 30-31) that the religious orders contributed in aid of the royal position. The documentation on his correspondence with the pope is amply displayed, as is indeed all the recent writing on the Patronato. Garcia de Mendoza, recent viceroy in Peru, is shown as a strong protagonist of the crown contention. The Council of the Indies held the same views. Clearly the patronage had subverted the mind, and perhaps the objectivity, of what might be called the ruling class.

W. EUGENE SHIELS, S.J.

Xavier University, Ohio

"Sunset" *Cox Irrepressible Democrat*. By David Lindsey. Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1959. Pp. xx, 313. \$5.00.

Samuel Sullivan Cox as a young editor of the *Columbus Ohio Statesman* wrote a glowing account of an 1853 sunset, thereafter affixed to him as an agnomen. Cox, who graduated with honors from Brown Univer-

sity in 1846, was an indifferent attorney, a better journalist, and an avid politician. He was noted for his ability to write, as Lindsey's list of twenty-three items of Cox's in the excellent biography testifies, and to speak, and was famous for his sense of humor.

Cox emerges from Lindsey's pen as a Douglas popular-sovereignty follower in 1856, when Ohioans first elected him to Congress. In the secession crisis Cox stood for compromise but in January, 1861, "denied the right of secession." He blamed the crisis on extremists. As House minority leader he led the wartime "loyal opposition" and supported armed intervention tempered with "moderation and generosity toward the South." Cox opposed the draft, was a critic of the administration's civil liberty policies, and also denounced the Second Confiscation Act. To him, this meant the war was actually being fought to abolish slavery and not only to preserve the Union. He thought it would better serve the cause to "leave to the states their own institutions." He voted against the Thirteenth Amendment at the last moment, although by 1865 he had been advocating that the Democrats strengthen themselves by "throwing off the proslavery odium." In 1864, Cox, a McClellan proponent, was gerrymandered out of his Ohio district and lost his first election in eight years.

He moved to New York City in 1865, and with Tammany's support returned to Congress in 1868. Cox's *bête noir* in post-war politics was the tariff. A free-trader, he worked hard for reduction. He opposed greenbacks and railroad land grants and supported general amnesty, resumption, and in 1877 free silver. A ranking Democrat, he was greatly disappointed to be passed over for Speaker of the House.

Lindsey touches on some interesting problems but does not exploit them. For example, after the Republican Congressional defeat in 1862, were Republican-sponsored repressive measures a conscious effort to maintain control of the government? He notes that it "is impossible to determine" Cox's relationship to Tammany: but certainly the machine was useful? Lindsey offers no concrete explanation why Cox, who behaved like a typical Eastern Democrat, switched to free silver. There are no glaring errors in the book, though customarily pictures are hung and people hanged (p. 153).

Cox, the witty politician comes through well, yet Cox, the man, remains buried, pity that it is, even though Lindsey meant it that way. The book seemed occasionally superficial because Lindsey did not stop to put many events in the perspective of the times. The post-war chapters become a dreary recital of session-by-session activities, but there is enough sparkle in the rest of the book to carry it. All in all this is a careful and useful study, a product of hard work and research (as the end-notes attest), and Lindsey did what he set out to do: he presented the political career of a Nineteenth Century politician, an interesting, though not a key figure, whose public services spanned nearly half a century.

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Notes and Comments

The Philosophy of Abraham Lincoln in His Own Words, compiled by William E. Barringer, Executive Director of the Lincoln Sesquicentennial Commission, was published late last year by Falcon's Wing Press of Indian Hills, Colorado, as one of the Keystone Series of enduring books. The general editor of the Keystone Series, C. A. Muses, has a stirring introduction to the volume, in which he eloquently enlarges upon the principles of Lincoln as opposed to those of Lenin and pleads for an adherence to Lincoln's philosophy in the face of the Communist threat to civilization. Professor Barringer compresses the philosophy of Lincoln into 167 pages, divided into ten chapters: Human Interest, On Politics and Politicians, On Slavery, On Law, On American Institutions, On Liberty, On Religion, On Labor, On Union, Disunion, and War, and On Civil Liberties. The sayings of Lincoln are culled from the Basler-Pratt-Dunlay edition of *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln* published in 1903. The book is very handy and its contents are ever inspiring. Its list price is \$3.50.

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Readings in Church History, Volume I, *From Pentecost to the Protestant Revolt*, edited by Coleman J. Barry, O.S.B., was published last year by The Newman Press, Westminster, Maryland. This is a collection of primary documents carefully selected and grouped to indicate the major developments, trends, crises, and heresies in the history of the Church from the time of Christ to the early 1500's. Preceding each group is a very helpful compendium of the history of the time covered in the documents. In all there are 103 numbered documents, more than a fourth of which numbers are sub-lettered A, B, C, etc. With the exception of five or six newly translated source materials all of the documents have already been translated and published in English in various books and at different times. Now they are brought together for the convenience of readers in 633 pages of double columns in a pleasing type. To make the volume more available the publisher has listed the cloth bound volume at \$7.50 and the paper covered volume at \$2.95. Either will make a worthy addition to a library shelf.